

This report is per your request in the above-referenced cases.

I. Qualifications

I am the Hamill Family Professor of Law and Psychology at the University of San Francisco, and formerly an Associate Professor of Psychology and an Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of California, Irvine. My areas of research, training, and specialization include social psychology, criminology, sociology, and law. For more than two decades, I have conducted extensive empirical research on police interrogation practices, the

psychology of interrogation and confessions, psychological coercion, police-induced false confessions, and erroneous convictions. In 1992 and 1993, I spent nine months doing field research inside the Oakland Police Department, which included sitting in on and contemporaneously observing one-hundred twenty-two (122) felony interrogations; in 1993, I also observed sixty (60) fully videotaped interrogations in the Vallejo and Hayward Police Departments in northern California. Since then, I have analyzed thousands of cases involving interrogations and confessions; I have researched, written, and published numerous peer-reviewed articles on these subjects in scientific and legal journals; and I have written several books on these subjects, including *Police Interrogation and American Justice* (Harvard University Press, 2008) and *Confessions of Guilt: From Torture to Miranda and Beyond* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

I am regarded as a national and leading expert on these topics, and I have won numerous individual and career achievement awards for my scholarship and publications. My scholarship has often been featured in the news media and cited by appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court, on multiple occasions. To date, I have consulted with criminal and civil attorneys on approximately eighteen-hundred (1,800) cases involving disputed interrogations and/or confessions, and I have been qualified and testified as an expert witness three-hundred and eighteen (318) times in state, federal and military courts in thirty-four (34) states (including in the State of New York) and the District of Columbia. I have testified thirteen times in federal courts and seven times in military court. I have given many lectures to judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and other criminal justice professionals, and I have taught interrogation training courses and/or given lectures to police departments in the United States, China, and the Republic of Cyprus. My qualifications are summarized in greater detail in my curriculum vitae, which is attached to this report.

III. Overview

In this report, I will first provide an overview of the relevant social science research on the psychology of police interrogation practices and techniques, police-induced false confessions, risk factors for false confession, psychological coercion, police interrogation contamination, and indicia of unreliability. I will then discuss these issues as they relate to the

More specifically, in my professional opinion:

1) It has been well-documented in the empirical social science research literature that a substantial number of innocent suspects have confessed during police interrogation to crimes (often very serious crimes such as murder and rape) that it was later objectively proven they did not commit;

2) It has been well-documented in the empirical social science research literature that the primary, sequential causes of false confession are: 1) poor, overzealous, negligent and/or reckless police investigation leading to a premature and erroneous misclassification of an innocent person as a guilty suspect; 2) subjecting that factually innocent but misclassified person to a guilt-presumptive, accusatory and deceptive, manipulative and/or coercive interrogation; and 3) feeding (i.e., “contaminating”) that suspect (with) non-public case facts, details and/or theories that he or she is pressured and/or persuaded to incorporate into their confession statement and narrative;

IV. The Scientific Study of Police Interrogation and False Confessions

There is a well-established empirical field of research in the academic disciplines of psychology, criminology, and sociology on the subjects of police interrogation practices, psychological coercion, and false confessions. This research dates back to 1908; has been the

subject of extensive publication (hundreds of academic journal articles, stand-alone books, and book chapters in edited volumes); has been subjected to peer review and testing; is based on recognized scientific principles, methods, and findings; and is generally accepted in the social scientific community. Significantly, numerous courts have held repeatedly that these principles, methods, and findings are generally accepted in the social science community and therefore accepted expert testimony in criminal and civil rights litigation.²

This research has analyzed numerous police-induced false confessions and identified the personal and situational factors associated with, and believed to cause, false confessions.³ The fact that police-induced false confessions can and do occur has been well-documented and is not disputed by anyone in the law enforcement or academic community. Indeed, leading police interrogation training manuals have, at least since 2001, contained entire chapters and sections on the problem of police-induced false confessions and what investigators need to know to better understand and avoid eliciting false confessions from innocent suspects.⁴ Social scientists have documented hundreds of proven false confessions in America since the early 1970s,⁵ but this is

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- ² Saul M. Kassin et al., *Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations*, 34 L. & Hum. Behav. 3, 16 (2010) (noting that “false confessions tend to occur after long periods of time” and “sleep deprivation is historically one of the most potent methods used to ... extract confessions”); Gisli H. Gudjonsson et al., *Custodial Interrogation, False Confession and Individual Differences: A National Study Among Icelandic Youth*, 41 Personality & Individual Differences 49, 56 (2006) (finding that depressed mood is linked to a susceptibility to provide false confession to police); Brandon L. Garrett, *The Substance of False Confessions*, 62 Stan. L.Rev. 1051, 1087 (2010) (“The vast majority of these exonerees made statements in their interrogations that were contradicted by crime scene evidence, victim accounts, or other evidence known to police during their investigation.”); Richard A. Leo, *False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications*, 37 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 332, 337 (2009) (“Interrogators help create the false confession by pressuring the suspect to accept a particular account and by suggesting facts of the crime to him, thereby contaminating the suspect's postadmission narrative.... If the entire interrogation is captured on audio or video recording, then it may be possible to trace, step by step, how and when the interrogator implied or suggested the correct answers for the suspect to incorporate into his post admission narrative.”); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, *Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions*, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 337, 339–41 (2001) (*accord*).
- ³ See Saul Kassin, Steven Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo and Allison Redlich (2010). “Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations” in *Law and Human Behavior*, 34, 3-38; Richard A. Leo (2008), *POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE* (Harvard University Press); and Gisli Gudjonsson (2003), *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK* (John Wiley & Sons Inc).
- ⁴ See, for example, See Fred Inbau, John Reid, Joseph Buckley and Brian Jayne (2001). *CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS*, 4th Edition (Aspen Publishers, Inc.) at 411-448; and David Zulawski and Douglas Wicklander (2002). *PRACTICALASPECTS OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION*, 2nd Edition (CRC Press) at 73-104.
- ⁵ The largest published study of proven false confessions to date is Steven Drizin and Richard A. Leo (2004). “The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World. *North Carolina Law Review*, 82, 891-1007. For a review of the literature documenting proven false confessions, see Richard A. Leo (2008), *POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE*. At that time, there were approximately two-hundred and fifty to three-hundred proven false confessions in the documented literature. Since 2004, Steve Drizin, Gillian

surely an underestimate and thus the tip of a much larger iceberg for several reasons. First, false confessions are difficult for researchers to discover because neither the state nor any organization keeps records of the interrogations producing them. Second, even when they are discovered, false confessions are notoriously hard to establish because of the factual and logical difficulties of proving the confessor's *absolute* innocence.

Only a small number of cases involving a disputed confession will ever come with independent case evidence that allows the suspect to prove his innocence beyond dispute because doing so is akin to proving the negative. The hundreds of documented false confessions in the scientific research literature is, therefore, a dramatic undercount of the actual false confessions that police have elicited in the United States in recent decades. There have almost certainly been thousands (if not tens or hundreds of thousands) more police-induced false confessions than researchers have been able to discover and classify as proven false. Indeed, in a survey of police that my colleagues and I published in 2007, police investigators themselves estimated that they elicited false confessions in 4.78% of their interrogations.⁶

The subject of police interrogation and false confessions is beyond common knowledge and highly counter-intuitive.⁷ Police detectives receive specialized training in psychological interrogation techniques; most people do not know what these techniques are or how the techniques are designed to work (*i.e.*, move a suspect from denial to admission). In addition, most people also do not know what psychological coercion is, why some techniques are regarded as psychologically coercive, and what their likely effects are. Moreover, most people do not know which interrogation techniques create a risk of eliciting false confessions or how and why the psychological process of police interrogation can, and sometimes does, lead suspects to falsely confess. This unfamiliarity causes most people to assume that virtually all confessions are true.

Emmerich and I have collected an additional two-hundred proven false confessions that are the subject of an academic article we are currently drafting but have not yet submitted for publication.

⁶ Saul Kassir, Richard Leo, Christian Meissner, Kimberly Richman, Lori Colwell, Amy-May Leach, and Dana La Fon (2007). "Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs," *Law and Human Behavior*, 31, 381-400.

⁷ See Danielle Chojnacki, Michael Cicchini and Lawrence White (2008), "An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert Testimony on False Confessions," *Arizona State Law Journal*, 40, 1-45; Richard A. Leo and Brittany Liu (2009). "What Do Potential Jurors Know About Police Interrogation and False Confessions?" *Behavioral Sciences and the Law*, 27, 381-399; Linda Henkel, Kimberly Coffman, and Elizabeth Dailey (2008). "A Survey of People's Attitudes and Beliefs About False Confessions," *Behavioral Sciences and the Law*, 26, 555-584; Iris Blandon-Gitlin, Kathryn Sperry, and Richard A. Leo (2011) "Jurors Believe Interrogation Tactics Are Not Likely to Elicit False Confessions: Will Expert Witness Testimony Inform Them Otherwise?" in *Psychology, Crime and Law*, 17, 239-260; and Mark Costanzo, Netta Shaked-Schroer and Katherine Vinson (2010), "Juror Beliefs About Police Interrogation, False Confession and Expert Testimony" in *The Journal of Legal Empirical Studies*, 7, 231-247.

V. The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation⁸

Police interrogation is a cumulative, structured, and time-sequenced process in which detectives draw on an arsenal of psychological techniques in order to overcome a suspect's denials and elicit incriminating statements, admissions, and/or confessions. This is the sole purpose of custodial interrogation. To achieve this purpose, interrogators use techniques that seek to influence, persuade, manipulate, and deceive suspects into believing that their situation is hopeless and that their best interest lies in confessing.⁹ Sometimes, however, interrogators cross the line and employ techniques and methods of interrogation that are coercive and increase the likelihood of eliciting unreliable confessions or statements.

Contemporary American interrogation methods are structured to persuade a rational guilty person who knows he is guilty to rethink his initial decision to deny culpability and choose instead to confess. Police interrogators know that it is not in any suspect's rational self-interest to confess. They expect to encounter resistance and denials to their allegations, and they know that they must apply a certain amount of interpersonal pressure and persuasion to convince a reluctant suspect to confess. As a result, interrogators have, over the years, developed a set of subtle and sophisticated interrogation techniques whose purpose is to alter a guilty suspect's perceptions so that he will see the act of confessing as being in his self-interest.

These interrogation techniques were developed for the purpose of inducing guilty individuals to confess to their crimes, and police are admonished in their training to use them only on suspects believed to be guilty.¹⁰ When these same techniques are used on innocent suspects, they carry a heightened risk that they will elicit false statements, admissions and/or confessions.

The goal of an interrogator is to persuade a suspect to view his immediate situation differently by focusing the suspect's attention on a limited set of choices and alternatives, and by convincing him of the likely consequences that attach to each of these choices. The process often unfolds in two steps: first, the interrogator causes the suspect to view his situation as hopeless; and, second, the interrogator persuades the suspect that only by confessing will the suspect be able to improve his otherwise hopeless situation. The interrogator makes it clear what

⁸ See Richard A. Leo (2009). "False Confessions: Causes, Consequences and Implications." *Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law*, 37, 332-343.

⁹ Deborah Davis and William O'Donohue (2004). "The road to perdition: Extreme influence tactics in the interrogation room," In William O'Donohue, ED (2004), *Handbook of Forensic Psychology* (San Diego: Academic Press). Pp. 897-996.

¹⁰ See Fred Inbau, John Reid, Joseph Buckley and Brian Jayne (2013). *CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS*, 5th Edition (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning) at 187 ("These nine steps are presented in the context of the interrogation of suspects whose guilt seems definite or reasonably certain"). For empirical support for this observation, see Richard A. Leo (2008). *POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE* (Harvard University Press).

information he is seeking and attempts to convince the suspect that his only rational option is to confirm the information the interrogator purports to already know.

The first step or stage of an interrogation consists of causing a suspect to view his situation as hopeless. If the interrogator is successful at this stage, he will undermine the suspect's self-confidence and cause the suspect to reason that there is no way to escape the interrogation without incriminating himself. To accomplish this, interrogators accuse the suspect of having committed the crime; they attack and try to undermine a suspect's assertion of an alibi, alternate sequence of events, or verbalization of innocence (pointing out or inventing logical and factual inconsistencies, implausibilities, and/or impossibilities); they exude unwavering confidence in their assertions of the suspect's and his accomplices' guilt; they refuse to accept the possibility of the suspect's denials; and, most importantly, they confront the suspect with incontrovertible evidence of his guilt, whether real or non-existent. Because interrogation is a cumulative and time-sequenced process, interrogators often draw on these techniques repeatedly and/or in succession, building on their earlier accusations, challenges and representations at each step in the interrogation process.

Through the use of these techniques, the interrogator communicates to the suspect that he has been caught, that there is no way he will escape the interrogation without incriminating himself and other suspects, and that his future is determined—that regardless of the suspect's denials or protestations of innocence, he is going to be arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and punished. The interrogator seeks to convince the suspect that this is a fact that has been established beyond any doubt, and thus that any objective person must necessarily reason to this conclusion. By persuading the suspect that he has been caught, that the existing evidence or case facts objectively prove his guilt, and that it is only a matter of time before he will be prosecuted and convicted, the interrogator seeks to alter the suspect's perceptions, such that he comes to view his situation as hopeless and to perceive that resisting the interrogator's demands is futile.

Once the interrogator has caused the suspect to understand that he has been caught and that there is no way out of this predicament, the interrogator seeks to convince the suspect that the only way to improve his otherwise hopeless situation is by confessing to the offense(s) of which he is accused and confirming the information the interrogator is seeking to extract from the suspect. The second step of the interrogation thus consists of offering the suspect inducements to confess—reasons or scenarios that suggest the suspect will receive some personal, moral, communal, procedural, material, legal or other benefit if he confesses to the interrogator's version of the offense. One goal of these scenarios or inducements is to downplay both the seriousness of the alleged crime as well as the consequences of confessing, leading the suspect to perceive that the consequences of continuing to deny the accusations will be worse than the consequences of admitting to participation in the crime. The interrogator's attempt to diminish the suspect's perception of the consequences of confessing is combined with techniques that are designed to increase the suspect's anxiety in order to create the perceived need for

release from the stress of prolonged interrogation.¹¹ Investigators also use scenarios to plant ideas or suggestions about how or why the suspect may have committed the crime which they may later pressure the suspect to accept and repeat.

Researchers have classified the types of inducements investigators use during the second step of interrogation into three categories: *low-end* inducements, *systemic* inducements, and *high-end* inducements.

Low-end inducements refer to interpersonal or moral appeals the interrogator uses to convince a suspect that he will feel better if he confesses. For example, an interrogator may tell a suspect that the truth will set him free if he confesses, that confessing will relieve his anxiety or guilt, that confessing is the moral or Christian thing to do, or that confessing will improve his standing in the eyes of the victim or the eyes of the community.

Systemic inducements refer to appeals that the interrogator uses to focus the suspect's attention on the processes and outcomes of the criminal justice system in order to get the suspect to come to the conclusion that his case is likely to be processed more favorably by all actors in the criminal justice system if he confesses. For example, an interrogator may tell a suspect that he is the suspect's ally and will try to help him out—both in his discussions with the prosecutor as well as in his role as a professional witness at trial—but can only do so if the suspect first admits his guilt. Or the interrogator may ask the suspect how he expects the prosecutor to look favorably on the suspect's case if the suspect does not cooperate with authorities. Or the interrogator may ask the suspect what a judge and jury are really going to think, and how they are likely to react, if he does not demonstrate remorse and admit his guilt to authorities. Interrogators often couple the use of *systemic* incentives with the assertion that this is the suspect's one and only chance—now or never—to tell his side of the story; if he passes up this opportunity, all the relevant actors in the system (police, prosecutor, judge and jury) will no longer be open to the possibility of viewing his actions in their most favorable light. This tactic may incentivize a suspect to either falsely confess or confirm an incorrect story for the interrogator based on the belief that the suspect will not have the same opportunity to help himself again in the future. Interrogators rely on *systemic* inducements to persuade the suspect to reason to the conclusion that the justice system naturally confers rewards for those who admit guilt, demonstrate remorse, and cooperate with authorities, whereas it inevitably metes out punishment for those who do not.

Finally, *high-end* inducements refer to appeals that directly communicate the message that the suspect will receive less punishment, a lower prison sentence and/or some form of

¹¹ See Brian Jayne (1986). "The Psychological Principles of Criminal Interrogation," in Fred Inbau, John Reid and Joseph Buckley (1986). CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, Third Edition (Baltimore, MD: Williams & Wilkins) at 332. ("The goal of interrogation is therefore to decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of confessing, while at the same time increasing the suspect's internal anxiety associated with his deception.").

police, prosecutorial, judicial or juror leniency and/or immunity if he complies with the interrogator's demand that he confess, but that the suspect will receive a higher sentence or greater punishment if he does not comply with the interrogator's demand that he confess. High-end inducements may either be implicit or explicit: the important question is whether the interrogation technique communicates the message, or is understood to communicate the message, that the suspect will receive a lower (or no) criminal charge and/or lesser (or no) punishment if he confesses as opposed to a higher criminal charge and/or greater amount of punishment if he does not. For example, if police interrogators lead a suspect to believe he will be able to go home and not be charged with a homicide if he confesses to witnessing the crime and fingering someone else as the triggerman, this would be a *high-end* inducement because it communicates immunity in exchange for making such a statement.

Explicit *high-end* incentives can include telling a suspect that there are several degrees of the alleged offense, each of which carry different amounts of punishment, and asking the suspect which version he would like to confess to. Or the interrogator may explicitly tell the suspect that he will receive a long prison sentence—or perhaps even the death penalty—if he does not confess to the interrogator's version of events. The interrogator may also point out what happens to men of the suspect's age, or men accused of crime, in prison if the suspect does not confess to the interrogator's minimized account. Sometimes interrogators who rely on *high-end* inducements will present the suspect with a simple two-choice situation (good vs. bad): if the suspect agrees to the good choice (a minimized version of the offense, such as involuntary manslaughter or self-defense, or the implication of another person), he will receive a lower amount of punishment or no punishment at all; but if he does not confess right then, criminal justice officials will impute to him the bad choice (a maximized version of the offense, such as pre-meditated first degree murder, or that the suspect was acting alone), and he will receive a higher level of punishment, or perhaps the harshest possible punishment.¹² The purpose of *high-end* inducements is to communicate to a suspect that it is in his rational self-interest to confess to the minimized or less-incriminating version of events that the interrogator is suggesting because if the suspect does so, he will receive a lower charge, a lesser amount of punishment and/or no time in prison, but if he fails to do so, he will receive a higher charge, a greater amount of punishment and more time in prison, perhaps even the death penalty.

To evaluate whether a particular interrogation was psychologically coercive, an expert must evaluate the interrogator's techniques, methods, and strategies in the light of the generally accepted findings of the social science research literature on the subjects of interrogation, coercive influence techniques, and confessions.

¹² This technique is sometimes referred to in the academic literature as the maximization/minimization technique. See Saul Kassin, Steven Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo and Allison Redlich (2010). "Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations" in *Law and Human Behavior*, 34, 3-38; Richard A. Leo (2008), *POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE* (Harvard University Press).

Social science research has repeatedly demonstrated that some *systemic* inducements (depending on the content of the inducement, how explicitly or vaguely it is stated, and the message that it communicates) and all *high-end* inducements are coercive because they rely on implicit and/or explicit promises of leniency and threats of harm to induce compliance. *Systemic* and *high-end* inducements increase the likelihood of eliciting false confessions and false statements from suspects because of the *quid pro quo* arrangement and the benefit a suspect expects to receive in exchange for the information the interrogator is seeking, regardless of whether the suspect knows that information to be true or not. Such promises of leniency and threats of harm are regarded as coercive in the social science literature because of the messages they convey and their demonstrated impact on the decision-making of individuals. The expert may also evaluate whether the interrogation techniques, either individually or cumulatively, had the effect of causing a suspect to perceive that he had no choice but to comply with the demands of the interrogator, and thus, the interrogation, in effect, overbore the suspect's will.

VI. The Three Types of False Confessions

False confessions and false statements, of course, will occur in response to traditionally-coercive methods of interrogation such as the use of physical violence, threats of immediate physical harm, excessively long or incommunicado interrogation, or deprivation of essential necessities such as food, water, and/or sleep. However, these types of traditionally coercive techniques no longer appear to be common in the United States. The psychological techniques of interrogation that cross the line and sometimes cause false confessions typically involve one of two patterns: (1) the interrogator communicates to the suspect, implicitly or explicitly, that he will receive a higher charge and harsher sentence or punishment if he does not provide a satisfactory statement, but that he will receive a lesser charge or sentence, or perhaps no charge or punishment at all, if he does; or (2) the interrogator wears down and distresses the suspect to the point that the suspect subjectively feels that he has no choice but to comply with the interrogator's demands if he is to put an end to the intolerable stress of continued interrogation and/or escape the oppressive interrogation environment. As will be discussed below, some individuals have a greater vulnerability to making false confessions both because of their individual characteristics (e.g., juveniles, the mentally handicapped, etc) or because of certain interrogation techniques (e.g., being promised freedom and immunity in exchange for admitting to witnessing a crime).

Whether a police-induced false confession or statement is caused primarily by coercive interrogation techniques or by a suspect's pre-existing vulnerabilities to interrogation, or some combination of both, there are three fundamental types of false confessions and statements: a *voluntary* false confession or statement (*i.e.*, a false confession knowingly given in response to little or no police pressure); a *coerced-* or *stress-compliant* false confession or statement (*i.e.*, a false confession knowingly given to put an end to the interrogation or to receive an anticipated benefit or reward in exchange for confession); and a *coerced-* or *non-coerced-persuaded* false confession or statement (*i.e.*, a confession given by a suspect who comes to doubt the reliability

of his memory and thus comes to believe that he may have committed the crime, despite no actual memory of having done so).¹³ These different types of false confession typically involve different levels of police pressure, a different psychology of influence and decision-making, and different beliefs about the likelihood of one's guilt. Regardless of type, false confessors typically recant their confessions shortly after they are removed from the pressures and reinforcements of the interrogation environment.

VII. The Three Sequential Police Errors That Can Lead to False (But Sometimes Detailed) Confessions

There are three important decision points in the interrogation process that are known to be linked to false confessions or statements. The first decision point is the police decision to classify someone as a suspect. This is important because police only *interrogate* individuals whom they first classify as suspects; police *interview* witnesses and victims. There is a big difference between interrogation and interviewing: unlike interviewing, an interrogation is accusatory, involves the application of specialized psychological interrogation techniques, and the ultimate purpose of an interrogation is to get an incriminating statement from someone whom police believe to be guilty of the crime. False confessions or statements occur when police misclassify an innocent suspect as guilty and then subject him to a custodial interrogation, and are satisfied with elicitation of a version of events that, in fact, is not true. This is one reason why interrogation training manuals implore detectives to investigate their cases before subjecting any potential suspect to an accusatorial interrogation.¹⁴

The second important decision point in the process occurs when the police interrogate the suspect. Again, the goal of police interrogation is to elicit an incriminating statement from the suspect by moving him from denial to admission. To accomplish this, police use psychologically-persuasive, manipulative, and deceptive interrogation techniques. As described in detail in the previous sections, police interrogators use these techniques to accuse the suspect of committing the crime, to persuade him that he is caught and that the case evidence overwhelmingly establishes his guilt, and then to induce him to confess by suggesting it is the best course of action for him. However, properly trained police interrogators do not use physically- or psychologically-coercive techniques because they may result in involuntary and/or unreliable incriminating statements, admissions, and/or confessions.

¹³ See Richard Ofshe and Richard A. Leo (1997) "The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions." *Studies in Law, Politics & Society*, Vol. 16. Pp. 189-251.

¹⁴ Fred Inbau, John Reid and Joseph Buckley (1986). *CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS*, Third Edition (Baltimore, MD: Williams & Wilkins) at 3 ("Prior to the interrogation, and preferably before any contact with the suspect, become thoroughly familiar with all the known facts and circumstances of the case."). See also Fred Inbau, John Reid, Joseph Buckley and Brian Jayne (2013). *CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS*, 5th Edition (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning) at 18 ("One basic principle to which there must be full adherence is that the interrogation of suspects should follow, and not precede, an investigation conducted to the full extent permissible by the allowable time and circumstances of the particular case. The authors suggest, therefore, that a good guideline to follow is "investigate before you interrogate").

The third important decision point in the interrogation process occurs after the police have elicited an admission—an “I did it” statement—from the suspect. This is referred to as the post-admission phase of the interrogation. The post-admission phase of the interrogation is important because it is here that the police can acquire information and evidence that will either support or not support the accuracy of the suspect’s admission. Properly-trained police interrogators should know that innocent people sometimes falsely confess to crimes they did not commit.¹⁵ Properly-trained police interrogators also know that guilty suspects sometimes implicate others for crimes they themselves committed in order to diminish their role in the crime. Interrogators therefore will seek to elicit information (that is not generally known and cannot likely be guessed by chance) from the suspect that either demonstrates, or fails to demonstrate, independent knowledge of the crime scene details and case facts. Properly-trained police interrogators, therefore, will not ask leading or suggestive questions and will not educate the suspect about details of the victim’s allegations or of the alleged crime. Instead, they will let the suspect supply the details of the case independently. Properly-trained police interrogators will also seek to test the suspect’s post-admission account against the physical and other credible evidence. Truthful confessions and statements are typically corroborated by solid physical evidence and independent knowledge of underlying case facts that have not been suggested to the suspect; false confessions and false statements are not.¹⁶

VIII. Populations with Particular Vulnerability in the Interrogation Room

While coercive and/or improper interrogation techniques are often the primary cause of false confessions, certain types or groups of individuals are far more vulnerable to the pressures of interrogation, having their will overborne and/or making a false confession. This includes individuals who are mentally ill, and therefore may confess falsely because they are easily confused, disoriented, delusional or experiencing a non-rational emotional or mental state. This also includes juveniles and individuals with a low IQ or low-level cognitive functioning, who may be more vulnerable to interrogators because of their inability to understand the nature

¹⁵ Although the “Reid” Manual (CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS by Fred Inbau et al.) did not include a full chapter on false confessions until the Fourth Edition in 2001, the need for police interrogators to be diligent to avoid false confessions has been present for decades. From the very first manual in 1942 and in all subsequent editions (1948, 1953, 1962, 1967, 1986, 2001 and 2013), it has repeatedly implored interrogators not to use any methods that are “apt to make an innocent person confess to a crime he did not commit,” implicitly, if not explicitly, suggesting that police interrogator do know that suspects can be made to falsely confess to crimes they did not commit.

¹⁶ Richard A. Leo and Richard Ofshe (1998). “The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation” *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*. Vol. 88, No. 2. Pp. 429-496. This observation has been made in the police interrogation training literature as well. See also Fred Inbau, John Reid, Joseph Buckley and Brian Jayne (2013). CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, 5th Edition (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning) at 354-360.

or gravity of their situation, their inability to foresee the consequences of their actions, their inability to cope with stressful situations and/or their eagerness to please others, especially authority figures. Juveniles may also be more easily intimidated than adults and may lack the maturity, knowledge, or sense of authority needed to resist simple police pressures and manipulations. Finally, this also includes individuals who, by their nature and personality, are naive, excessively trusting of authority, highly suggestible and/or highly compliant and who are therefore predisposed to believe that they have no choice but to comply with the demands of authorities or who simply lack the psychological resources to resist the escalating pressures of accusatorial interrogation.¹⁷

IX. Evaluating the Reliability of Incriminating Statements, Admissions and Confessions

In addition to studying the psychology of police interrogation and the correlates and causes of false confessions from the innocent, scientific researchers have also analyzed the patterns, characteristics and indicia of reliability in true and false confession cases. To evaluate the likely reliability or unreliability of an incriminating statement, admission or full confession from a suspect, scientific researchers analyze the fit between the suspect's post-admission narrative and the crime facts and/or corroborating evidence derived from the confession (*e.g.*, location of the missing murder weapon, loot from a robbery, the victim's missing clothing, etc.).¹⁸

The purpose of evaluating the fit between a suspect's post-admission narrative and the underlying crime facts and derivative crime evidence is to test the suspect's actual knowledge of the crime. If the suspect's post-admission narrative corroborates details only the police know, leads to new or previously undiscovered evidence of guilt, explains apparent crime fact anomalies and is corroborated by independent facts and evidence, then the suspect's post-admission narrative objectively demonstrates that he possesses the actual knowledge that would be known only by the true perpetrator and therefore is strong evidence of guilt. If the suspect cannot provide police with the actual details of the crime, fails to accurately describe the crime scene facts, cannot lead the police to new or derivative crime evidence, and/or provides an account that is full of gross errors and disconfirmed by the independent case evidence, then the suspect's post-admission narrative demonstrates that he fails to possess the actual knowledge that would be known only by the true perpetrator and is therefore strongly consistent with innocence.

¹⁷ See Saul Kassin, Steven Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo and Allison Redlich (2010). "Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations" in *Law and Human Behavior*, 34, 3-38; Richard A. Leo (2008), *POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE* (Harvard University Press).

¹⁸ See Richard Ofshe and Richard A. Leo (1997) "The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions." *Studies in Law, Politics & Society*, Vol. 16. Pp. 189-251; and Richard A. Leo and Richard Ofshe (1998). "The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation" *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*. Vol. 88, No. 2. Pp. 429-496.

Indeed, absent contamination, the fit between the suspect's post-admission narrative and both the crime scene facts and the derivative crime evidence therefore provides an objective basis for evaluating the likely reliability of the suspect's incriminating statements.

The well-established and widely accepted social science research principle of using the fit standard to evaluate the validity of a confession statement is also a bedrock principle of criminal investigation within law enforcement. Properly trained police detectives realize that an "I did it" statement is not necessarily evidence of guilt and may, instead, turn out to be evidence of innocence. For example, in high-profile murder cases, police regularly screen out volunteered confessions by seeing whether or not the person can tell the police details known only to the perpetrator or lead the police to derivative crime evidence that either corroborates, or fails to demonstrate, the person's guilty knowledge. Police often keep particularly heinous or novel aspects of the crime from the press so that they can be used to demonstrate a confessor's guilty knowledge. Police sometimes deliberately include an error in media releases or allow incorrect statements to go uncorrected so that a true perpetrator will be able to demonstrate his personal knowledge of the crime. In other types of cases, police detectives regularly rely upon the fit standard to identify a true admission that might be mixed in with a collection of volunteered statements.

Using the fit standard to evaluate the validity of a suspect's incriminating statements, admissions or confessions is a bedrock principle of law enforcement because police detectives realize that seeking corroboration during the post-admission phase of interrogation is essential to proper investigative work.¹⁹ This is because it is a fundamental principle of police investigation that true explanations can be supported and false explanations cannot be supported (assuming no contamination has occurred), and because false explanations will not fit the facts of the crime, lead to derivative evidence or be corroborated by independent evidence.

Moreover, post-admission narrative analysis and the fit standard are central to proper criminal investigation because properly-trained detectives should realize that the purpose of detective work is not to clear a crime or get a conviction, but to carefully collect evidence in a way that will lead to the arrest, prosecution and conviction of the guilty while at the same time ensuring that no innocent individual is wrongly arrested, prosecuted or convicted.

A suspect's post-admission narrative therefore provides a gold mine of potential evidence to the unbiased, properly-trained detective who is seeking to ferret out the truth. If the suspect is guilty, the collection of a detailed post-admission narrative will allow the detective to establish the suspect's guilt beyond question, both by demonstrating the suspect's actual knowledge and by corroborating the suspect's statements with derivative evidence. Properly-trained detectives realize that the strongest form of corroboration comes through the development of new evidence using a suspect's post-admission narrative. While it is not possible to verify every post-

¹⁹ Fred Inbau, John Reid, Joseph Buckley and Brian Jayne (2013). *CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS*, 5th Edition (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning) at 354-360.

admission narrative with the crime facts, a skillful interrogator will seek as much verifiable information about the crime as he can elicit. The more verifiable information elicited from a suspect during the post-admission period and the better it fits with the crime facts, the more clearly the suspect demonstrates his responsibility for the crime.

If the suspect is innocent, the detective can use the suspect's post-admission narrative to establish his lack of knowledge and thus demonstrate his likely or certain innocence. Whereas a guilty suspect can corroborate his admission because of his actual knowledge of the crime, the innocent suspect cannot. The more information the interrogator seeks, the more frequently and clearly an innocent suspect will demonstrate his ignorance of the crime. His answers will turn out either to be wrong, to defy evaluation, or to be of no value for discriminating between guilt and innocence. Assuming that neither the investigator nor the media have contaminated the suspect by transferring information about the crime facts, or that the extent of contamination is known, the likelihood that his answers will be correct should be no better than chance. Absent contamination, the only time an innocent person will contribute correct information is when he makes an unlucky guess. The likelihood of an unlucky guess diminishes as the number of possible answers to an investigator's questions grows large. If, however, his answers about missing evidence are proven wrong, he cannot supply verifiable information that should be known to the perpetrator, and he inaccurately describes verifiable crime facts, then the post-admission narrative provides evidence of innocence.

This, of course, assumes that the suspect's knowledge of the crime has not been contaminated by the media, community gossip, the police or some other source with inside knowledge about crime details. If a suspect has learned unique or non-public crime facts from one of these sources, then the fact that his confession contains these details is, of course, not indicative of pre-existing knowledge or probative of guilt. This problem is discussed in detail in the following section. Finally, it is worth mentioning that in some cases police interrogators contaminate a suspect with a perceived fact that they believe to be true at the time of the interrogation but which subsequently turns out to be provably false. Such provably false facts are also regarded as an indicia of the confession's falsity.

X. The Problem of Contamination

The post-admission narrative process is about more than merely eliciting information from the suspect. Investigators in practice have been observed to shape the suspect's narrative to make the confession as persuasive as possible and to enhance the chances of conviction.²⁰ In this way, confessions are scripted or constructed by interrogators. A persuasive crime narrative requires an explanation of why the crime happened—the motives and explanations of the suspect for committing the crime. It also should contain a statement of the suspect's emotions, not only his or her emotions at the time of committing the crime, but also the shame, regret, or

²⁰ Richard A. Leo (2008). *POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE* (Harvard University Press) at 165-194.

remorse the suspect now feels for having committed the crime. Interrogators are also trained to get the suspect to cleanse the interrogation process, usually by providing statements to the effect that the confession was voluntary. Interrogators will ask the suspect, usually after the suspect's resistance has been broken down and he has been made to believe that it is in his best interests to confess, whether the suspect was treated well, given food and drink, bathroom breaks, and other comforts, and whether any promises or threats were made to the suspect. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, interrogators seek to ensure that the confession contains both general and specific crime knowledge—the details of the crime that only the true perpetrator should know.

The problem of contamination in false confession cases arises when the interrogator pressures a suspect during the post-admission narrative phase to accept a particular account of the crime story—one that usually squares with the interrogator's theory of how the crime occurred—and then suggests crime facts to the suspect, leads or directs the suspect to infer correct answers, and sometimes even suggests plausible motives for committing the crime.²¹ Because they are trained to presume the guilt of those whom they interrogate, American police assume that they are interrogating suspects who already know the correct crime facts. But this is not true when they are mistakenly interrogating an innocent person.

Instead, the innocent suspect is pressured to use facts disclosed to him by his interrogators in order to construct a plausible-sounding confession and post-admission narrative. Indeed, the presence of these details in the suspect's confession falsely gives the suspect's narrative credibility and the appearance of corroboration. Moreover, suspects who have been pressured and coerced into falsely confessing are motivated to please their interrogator(s) in order to put an end to the interrogation, and, as a result, often will make up and/or embellish known or suggested facts in order to make their confession seem more plausible and pleasing to the interrogators who, at that moment, control their fate in the interrogation room. After police interrogators have contaminated the suspect with non-public crime facts, they often attribute "guilty knowledge" to the suspect when he repeats back and incorporates into his confession the very facts that they first educated him about. One researcher has called these contaminated details "misleading specialized knowledge."²² In many false confession cases, police and prosecutors argue that the suspect's confession corroborates his guilt because he "knows facts only the true perpetrator would know," even though the suspect first learned these facts from his interrogators. Police contamination and scripting therefore increase the risk that false confessions, once given, will cause third parties to erroneously believe that they contain indicia of reliability and thus increase the risk that the (contaminated) false confession will lead to a wrongful conviction.

Of course, if the interrogation process is not electronically recorded, the interrogator is free to assert that these crime facts were volunteered by the suspect and the trial may devolve

²¹ Richard A. Leo (2008), *POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE* (Harvard University Press).

²² Gisli Gudjonsson (2003), *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK* (John Wiley & Sons Inc).

into a swearing contest between the suspect and the interrogators over who was the source of the details in the confession. If the entire process is recorded, however, then it may be possible to trace the contamination.

Researchers have found that contamination by police regularly occurs in interrogation-induced false confession cases. In a study of the first two-hundred and fifty (250) post-conviction DNA exonerations of innocent prisoners in the American criminal justice system, Professor Brandon Garrett of the University of Virginia Law School showed that this pattern was present in 95% of the false confession cases in this data set (38 of 40 cases). In other words, in the overwhelming majority of these proven false confession cases, police interrogators fed the suspect unique non-public facts that “only the true perpetrator would know,” but the prosecutor erroneously alleged that the suspect volunteered these facts and that the suspect thereby corroborated the reliability of his confession. But because the jury in each case mistakenly believed the prosecutor rather than the defense, each of the confessors was convicted, and in each of these cases the defendant’s innocence (and the falsity of the confession) was only proven many years later by DNA.²³ In a recent follow-up study more recent false confession DNA exonerations, Garrett found that another 21 of 23 (91%) were contaminated.²⁴

In sum, the problem of contamination means that when applying the fit test to assess the reliability of the confession, it is essential to separate out the contaminated facts from the facts that unquestionably were provided by the defendant.