| Lying about evidence
Pretending to have evidence against accused, generally--Confession held admissible
Where one of the police officers made a false statement to the defendant, accused of murder, as to the evidence against him and a faked photograph showing his fingerprint upon the shoe of the victim was brought to his
attention, thus tending to show that the officers had evidence pointing strongly to his guilt, the court in Lewis v United States (1934, CA9 Idaho) 74 F2d 173, stated that with reference to the false statement and representations to the accused concerning the evidence against him, the generally recognized rule was that to obtain the confession by direct statements of this sort does not render the confession involuntary.
|Citing People v Buffom (1915) 214 NY 53, 108 NE 184, as authority, the court added that it saw no reason for questioning the soundness of this decision and that while false statements as to the amount of incriminating evidence against the defendant might tend to make a guilty man confess, they would not have the tendency if the man was not guilty, unless the statement as to the evidence was coupled with some promise or representation in regard to the advantage to be gained by the confession, or a plea of guilty.
Similarly, where defendants were told by police officers that they could introduce them to persons who saw them steal the property, which statement was not in strict accord with the facts, and the defendants thereupon confessed, the confession was held not to be inadmissible because induced by deceptive methods or false statements. People v Castello (1924) 194 Cal 595, 229 P 855, ovrld on other grounds People v Ditson (1962) 57 Cal 2d 415, 20 Cal Rptr 165, 369 P2d 714, vacated on other grounds 371 US 541, 9 L ed 2d 508,
83 S Ct 519, cert dismd 372 US 933, 9 L ed 2d 769, 83 S Ct 885.
An unproved statement made to the defendant to the effect that the fingerprints taken from the cash register robbed at the time of the commission of the murder with which defendant was charged corresponded with his was held in People v Connelly (1925) 195 Cal 584, 234 P 374, not to be legally sufficient to justify the exclusion of the statement in the nature of a confession subsequently made by the defendant. The court said that while the indulgence in deceptive methods or false statements is not morally justifiable or a commendable practice, this alone does not render a confession of guilt inadmissible.
Citing People v Connelly (Cal) supra, the court in People v Thompson (1955) 133 Cal App 2d 4, 284 P2d 39, held that even though police officers may have pretended to have more proof of defendant's participation in the crimes charged than they actually had, the employment of such an artifice to obtain a confession does not render the confession inadmissible if the means employed were not calculated to procure an untrue statement, the court adding that in the present case there was no indication that the attitude of the officers was calculated to procure or did procure any untrue statement.
The fact that police officers told defendant, who was charged with forging and uttering a prescription for a narcotic, that the pharmacist had made a positive identification of the defendant, and the defendant thereupon made a confession,
was held in People v Pendarvis (1961) 189 Cal App 2d 180, 10 Cal Rptr 923, not to render the confession coerced and involuntary although at the time of the confession the pharmacist had not identified the defendant. Citing People v Thompson (1955) 133 Cal App 2d 4, 284 P2d 39, supra, as authority, the court stated that a deception will not render a confession inadmissible unless the misrepresentations are of such a nature as would probably result in untrue statements and that it did not appear that the deception relating to the identification by the druggist was of such a nature as would lead to an untrue statement.
Stating that artifice, cunning, falsehood, and deception employed by officers in order to obtain a disclosure from a prisoner do not render a resulting confession involuntary, the court in State v Phelps (1881) 74 Mo 128, ovrld on other grounds State v Thompson (1884) 83 Mo 257, held a confession admissible although it was obtained by stating to the accused that he was tracked to the scene of the crime, that he was seen running across the fields from the locus delicti, and that his girl "had gone back on him."
Deception practiced by a detective was claimed to render a confession inadmissible in People v Everett (1962) 10 NY2d 500, 225 NYS2d 193, 180 NE2d 556, cert den 370 US 963, 8 L ed 2d 830, 82 S Ct 1593. It appeared in this case that during an illegal detention the defendant was told by the detective
in charge of the investigation, who at this time had knowledge of the victim's prior death, that the person whom the defendant was suspected of having killed by blows on his head was not badly hurt and was at that moment downstairs, that the detective could control the victim, and that it would help defendant if he told the truth. When the defendant denied having assaulted the victim, the detective left the room, allegedly to speak to the victim, and upon his return told the defendant that the victim had stated that defendant had assaulted him, whereupon the defendant said, "All right, I will tell the truth," and then admitted having robbed and assaulted the victim. Holding that the confession was admissible in evidence, the court, after referring to a number of earlier New York cases as well as cases from other jurisdictions, stated the general principle to the effect that a confession is admissible although obtained by artifice or deception and that deception alone does not render the confession invalid unless the deceiving acts amount to a deprivation of due process. In distinguishing People v Leyra (1951) 302 NY 353, 98 NE2d 553, stated supra 4, from the present case, the court pointed out that the instant case presented no such aggravating circumstances as would transform the deception practiced upon the defendant by the detective into a denial of due process. The admissions, according to the reasoning of the court, although obtained following deception, could nevertheless be found to have been voluntarily made in the hope of securing the detective's intercession with the victim, and since they were freely given and were not the product of physical or mental coercion they could be used against defendant. As to the fact that the confession was procured by fraud, the court stated that no objection was made to the admissibility of the confession on this ground and that the court properly charged the jury in this respect.[FN5] However, upon petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court in United States ex rel. Everett v Murphy (1964, CA2 NY) 329 F2d 68, reversed the state court's conviction on the ground that the conviction was obtained in violation of the accused's right to due process of law. The court said that while the deception of the accused as to the victim's survival of the attack might be ignored if it stood alone, it had been used to make more plausible the promise of assistance in order to induce confession, and concluded that a confession induced by police falsely promising assistance on a charge far less serious than the police knew would actually be brought could not be considered a voluntary confession.
A confession was held admissible which was induced by the sheriff's showing the prisoner a knife and saying that it was the one with which the murder was committed. Commonwealth was Cressinger (1899) 193 Pa 326, 44 A 433, wherein the court said: "The fact that it was obtained by a trick is no objection to its competency unless the circumstances are such as to suggest an inference
that through fear or hope a false confession may be made. There were no such circumstances in the present case, nor anything which required the judge to dwell particularly upon them in his charge. A knife was produced and the prisoner led to believe that it was his. Under this supposition he told where he had hidden his and then told the story of the murder. The object of evidence is to get at the truth, and a trick which has no tendency to produce a confession except one in accordance with the truth is always admissible. Society and the criminal are at war, and capture by surprise, or ambush, or masked battery is as permissible in one case as in the other."
A fact situation similar to the one described in Commonwealth v Cressinger (1899) 193 Pa 326, 44 A 433, supra, existed in Commonwealth v Spardute (1923) 278 Pa 37, 122 A 161, in which after the district attorney and other officials casually stated to the person accused of murder that they had certain evidence in their possession, among other things, that they had the knife with which the killing was done, defendant made a confession. Holding that he confession was admissible, the court stated that misrepresentations made to the defendant do not affect the integrity of his confession.
And the mere fact that a post-office inspector to whom the accused confessed made an untrue statement to the effect that he had possession of a stolen bill, was held in Rex v Ryan (1905) 9 Ont L 137 (CA), to be insufficient to exclude
the prisoner's statement.
Also holding that pretending to have evidence against accused was not so fundamentally unfair as to require suppression of confession:
NY -- People v. Albury, 156 A.D.2d 370, 548 N.Y.S.2d 325 (2d Dep't 1989), app den 75 NY2d 866, 553 NYS2d 298, 552 NE2d 877
NY -- People v. Walker, 278 A.D.2d 852, 717 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 2000)
NC -- State v. Baldwin, 125 N.C. App. 530, 482 S.E.2d 1 (1997), review allowed, writ allowed, 345 N.C. 756, 485 S.E.2d 299 (1997)
The following additional authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this section:
Police officer's false assurance that defendant was not in danger of prosecution by virtue of defendant's statements at state court trial of another person was not so coercive as to render defendant's statements involuntary.
U.S. v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405 (1st Cir. 1998).
Defendant's confession to murder was not coerced despite repeated offers by one police officer to obtain psychiatric help for defendant, misrepresentations that police already had enough evidence against defendant and that his fingerprints matched prints in blood in victims' apartment, detective's reference to electric chair, and use of "good cop/bad cop" routine in which questioner alternately feigned sympathy and offered help, then threatened to withdraw, where defendant was 23-year-old man of above-average intelligence, who was streetwise, had good fund of general information, and had attended school to tenth grade, and where defendant indicated toward end of interrogation that he had not confessed because of police conduct but because of his fear that what he had done to victims in blackout was something he might do to his own family. Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1988).
Use by police of several staged lineups to make defendant, convicted of criminal possession of weapon in second degree, believe that witnesses had recognized him from night of shooting, in order to elicit confession, after defendant had waived his Miranda rights, did not violate due process. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; McKinney's Penal Law 265.03. Bush v. Portuondo, 2003
WL 23185751 (E.D. N.Y. 2003).
Fact that defendant who gave murder confession during custodial interrogation by two police investigators at prison where he was incarcerated claimed he was deceived by one of the officers was insufficient to render his confession "involuntary," where he was not lied to, but, rather, the officer merely asked what would happen if he were to tell defendant that his fingerprints were found in blood at the murder scene, and where defendant did not even allege that an affirmative misrepresentation was made. Dallio v. Spitzer, 170 F. Supp. 2d 327 (E.D. N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1713, 158 L. Ed. 2d 402 (U.S. 2004).
Interrogators' false statements to sexual assault suspect, that he could go to jail if he lied to them and that they had physical evidence connecting him to crime, did not render his confession involuntary. U.S. v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2004).
In prosecution for deviate sexual assault, rape, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, defendant's confession was properly admitted at trial even though, after two prosecutors left interrogation room, officer told defendant that
department had received city police report indicating that witness had seen defendant's vehicle in alley where victim had been raped, and that defendant would have to explain why his vehicle was there, and, in fact, city police had made no such report, where inflating evidence of defendant's guilt interfered little, if at all, with his free and deliberate choice of whether to confess, for it did not lead him to consider anything beyond his own beliefs regarding his actual guilt or innocence, his moral sense of right and wrong, and his judgment regarding likelihood that police garnered enough valid evidence linking him to crime; deception did not interject type of extrinsic considerations that would have overcome defendant's will by distorting otherwise rational choice of whether to confess or remain silent. Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1992).
Defendant's statements to federal agent were involuntary and therefore inadmissible, where agent repeatedly told defendant he was not a suspect and would not be arrested, when in fact agent had arrest warrant in his possession and intended to arrest defendant upon completion of interview. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. U.S. v. Knowles, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
Murder defendant's confession was not rendered involuntary because one
interrogating officer made deceptive reference to nonexistent autopsy report concerning victim, and another suggested that defendant would "feel better" if he told them everything, where under totality of circumstances it did not appear that reference to nonexistent autopsy report caused defendant's will to be overborne or critically impair his capacity for self-determination; defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained during interrogation; he did not appear to be under influence of alcohol or drugs; interrogating officers made no threats and used no force; there was no evidence that defendant asked officers to cease interrogation; and at time officer referred to autopsy report, defendant had already admitted that he had stabbed victim. Norfolk v. Houston, 941 F. Supp. 894 (D. Neb. 1995).
Misrepresentations linking suspect to crime or statements which inflate extent of evidence against suspect do not necessarily render confession involuntary. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1997).
Rape defendant's otherwise voluntary confession was not rendered involuntary by police officer's false statements about fingerprint evidence found in victim's home. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998).
Suspect's confession was not coerced just because fire marshall agent falsely told him that physical evidence connected him to crime. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 1997).
Misrepresentation that murder weapon had been found did not render confession which resulted from misrepresentation inadmissible. Moore v. Hopper, 389 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
Placement of gun and fingerprints lifted from scene of bank robbery on table for purpose of insinuating that investigators had lifted defendant's fingerprints from scene of bank robbery, and telling defendant, "We have the evidence," (although he was not told that fingerprints had been identified as his own) did not render defendant's subsequent confession involuntary where there was no evidence that such acts were intended to mislead defendant into confessing falsely. Gilder v. State, 542 So. 2d 1306 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
Statements of police, to defendants who had voluntarily submitted to lie detector test, that test results indicated he had not committed crime but knew something about it, were not calculated to produce an untruth and thus even if
they were subterfuge, did not render defendant's confession involuntary. Canada v. State, 56 Ala. App. 722, 325 So. 2d 513 (Crim. App. 1975).
Defendant's confession to murder was not rendered involuntary by detective's false statement during interrogation that two witnesses had seen defendant run from truck stolen from murder victim, where defendant steadfastly denied stealing truck, indicating that his will was not overborne by false accusation. State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 800 P.2d 1260 (1990).
Confession was not rendered inadmissible despite officer's false statement to defendant that fingerprints at scene of crime matched defendant's where there was no evidence of threat, promise or physical coercion which, in addition to deception, would indicate existence of involuntary waiver of Fifth Amendment rights; in relation to totality of circumstances defendant was not overborne by deception to sufficient degree to render statement false or unreliable. State v. Winters, 27 Ariz. App. 508, 556 P.2d 809 (Div. 1 1976).
That police falsely informed defendant his fingerprints had been found on robbery and assault victim's wallet did not render defendant's subsequent confession to those crimes and separate murder and rape involuntary; deception
was unlikely to produce a false confession and record was otherwise devoid of any evidence showing a coercive climate, use of pressure tactics, or promises of help or leniency. People v. Farnam, 28 Cal. 4th 107, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 47 P.3d 988 (2002), as modified, (July 31, 2002) and cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1124, 123 S. Ct. 861, 154 L. Ed. 2d 806 (2003).
Murder defendant's confession to police during interrogation was not rendered inadmissible by fact that police falsely told defendant they already had incriminating evidence against him where police made no promise to obtain help for defendant if he confessed. People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857 (1990).
Defendant's confession to arresting officer was voluntary, and thus admissible, in prosecution for first degree sexual assault on an at-risk adult, despite defendant's allegation that officer made deceptive claim that police had found his semen in victim, when in fact, DNA evidence only indicated that defendant's DNA was consistent with semen found in victim; statement regarding DNA was not wholly inaccurate, because defendant's DNA was consistent with DNA evidence found in victim, defendant was not in custody at time of confession, he waived his Miranda rights and gave further incriminating responses after making
confession, and he wrote his statement while officer was out of room. People v. Klausner, 74 P.3d 421 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, (July 21, 2003).
In prosecution for felony murder of wife's grandmother and related offenses, fact that detective told defendant that defendant's fingerprints had been found on handle of knife used to stab victim, even though no fingerprints had actually been found, did not render confession involuntary, where such statements by police designed to lead suspect to believe that case against him was strong were common investigative techniques and would rarely, if ever, be sufficient to overcome defendant's will and to bring about confession to serious crime that was not freely self-determined, particularly if, as here, there was only one false representation made; moreover, as defendant himself testified at trial, he was not concerned that police may have found his fingerprints at victim's apartment because of his frequent visits there. State v. Lapointe, 237 Conn. 694, 678 A.2d 942 (1996).
Police detective did not trick defendant into admitting he had had sexual intercourse with rape victim in taxi on night he had taken victim as passenger by telling defendant it would be unwise for him to lie since cab had undergone forensic tests and would likely produce evidence of sexual activity if
defendant had engaged in any that night, even though detective was not aware of results of forensic tests. Detective's interrogation did not involve use of lies and did not rise to level of proscribed conduct, and defendant's will was not overborne and his capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired by detective's statement, and his incriminating statements were product of his essentially free and unconstrained choice. State v. Williams, 16 Conn. App. 75, 546 A.2d 943 (1988).
Detective's false statement that defendant's fingerprints had been found on water jug at scene of homicide and his statement that, if defendant had killed victim after victim confronted him with gun, crime might be less than first-degree murder, did not constitute sufficient trickery to overcome defendant's will and thus render his confession involuntary, where defendant was 37-year-old male with eleventh grade education, considerable experience with legal system, and well aware of consequences of confessing, defendant was not suffering from any physical ailments or under influence of any drugs, detective made no threats and engaged in no physical coercion of defendant, and did not make any express promise either that defendant would be charged with lesser crime or that he would be paroled, defendant received Miranda warnings on three occasions during six hours of intermittent interrogation and each time
acknowledged that he understood his rights, defendant never requested presence of lawyer to advise him, and when defendant asked to speak to his girlfriend, his request was promptly granted. Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682 (Del. 1986).
Defendant's confession to six murders was not rendered involuntary by one detective's alleged exaggeration of the extent of DNA evidence against defendant; deceptiveness of comment was minimal, considering that police had preliminary, but not one-to-one match, between blood sample taken from defendant and DNA evidence from the murders, defendant had repeatedly signed waiver forms and rejected counsel, and defendant had voluntarily provided blood sample within a couple hours of his arrest. Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S669, 2003 WL 22052316 (Fla. 2003), reh'g denied, (Nov. 5, 2003) and cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1885, 158 L. Ed. 2d 475, 72 U.S.L.W. 3632, 2004 WL 238028 (U.S. 2004).
Coercive interrogation techniques employed by detectives did not render defendant's confession to murders involuntary, even though detective did not know whether defendant's fingerprint was on duct tape used to bind victims when he represented that it was; although defendant was questioned for six hours,
interrogation occurred during early part of day, defendant was provided with drinks upon request and allowed to use bathroom, and although detective reminded defendant that he could face death penalty, he was never threatened with "electric chair." Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1997).
Totality of circumstances under which defendant confessed in burglary and sexual battery case indicated voluntariness notwithstanding that defendant was told that "glass was pretty full" with evidence against him when in fact there was not enough evidence to arrest him, that his prints had been found on window sill when only unidentifiable smudges had been lifted, that "we have got your hairs" from scene when comparison had not been made, and that if defendant was being straight it would assist in determining whether victim was being honest, where defendant was mature adult, and, although he had only seventh-grade education, he freely accompanied detectives to sheriff's office, claimed he understood his rights, answered their questions, and never requested attorney. State v. Moore, 530 So. 2d 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988).
Statement by defendant as to facts and circumstances surrounding homicide was admissible where it was obtained by police officers after they had falsely told him that they had found murder weapon. Moore v. State, 230 Ga. 839, 199
S.E.2d 243 (1973).
Defendant's Miranda waiver was not invalidated by police officer's statement to him that officer had received report from Chicago police department that his vehicle had been seen in same alley where complainant had been raped and that he would have to explain why his vehicle was there, when no such report existed. People v. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d 136, 117 Ill. Dec. 109, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987), judgment aff'd on other grounds, 493 U.S. 474, 110 S. Ct. 803, 107 L. Ed. 2d 905 (1990).
Statements made by defendant to police were properly admitted in evidence even though assistant State's attorney had deliberately misrepresented that defendant's fingerprints had been found all over place where murder occurred, where defendant was not restrained in any way during questioning which lasted from 8 p.m. until past midnight, although defendant claimed to have been afraid during questioning, he did not allege, and record contained no indication that he was threatened, intimidated, or physically mistreated, defendant continued to participate in questioning after being given Miranda rights and waiving them in writing, and defendant was literate and educated, had intelligence quotient of 110, held position as computer programmer, and appeared capable of
understanding his Miranda rights and implications of waiving those rights. People v. Kashney, 111 Ill. 2d 454, 95 Ill. Dec. 835, 490 N.E.2d 688 (1986).
In prosecution for murder of mother and son, even assuming that police officer knowingly misrepresented to defendant that mother's blood was found on defendant's clothing, misrepresentation was insufficient to disturb defendant's conviction for murdering mother, where defendant was advised of constitutional rights at time of arrest, prior to each of interviews, and prior to making oral and written confessions that he stabbed mother, and where defendant acknowledged he understood rights and voluntarily made statement regarding incident to police; police deception was only one of relevant factors to consider in determining whether confession had been voluntarily given. People v. Torry, 212 Ill. App. 3d 759, 156 Ill. Dec. 847, 571 N.E.2d 827 (1st Dist. 1991).
Confession would be suppressed where it was obtained as direct result of unlawful arrest, in spite of Miranda warnings, defendant gave statement only 25 minutes after his illegally- forced arrival at police station, there were no significant intervening circumstances, and there was evidence that officer attempted to elicit confession by claiming that he had defendant's fingerprints
from burglary. People v. Hollins, 169 Ill. App. 3d 304, 120 Ill. Dec. 398, 523 N.E.2d 1309 (3d Dist. 1988).
Although deception by police is factor to consider, court would look to totality of circumstances in determining whether confession was voluntary. Confession would not be considered involuntary because police officer falsely told defendant that his footprints had been found in burglarized home where defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, he was not threatened with physical harm or promised anything during questioning by police, defendant never testified that he made any incriminating statement after false statement by officer, and record did not reveal that defendant's age or educational level affected his ability to understand his rights and make voluntary statement. People v. Cortez, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 98 Ill. Dec. 242, 494 N.E.2d 169 (2d Dist. 1986).
Police officer's statement to murder suspect that he believed fingerprints recovered at victim's residence belonged to suspect, when in fact fingerprints were not identifiable, did not render suspect's confession inadmissible, where suspect had been thoroughly admonished as to his rights and was not subjected to physical abuse, threats or promises. People v. Boerckel, 68 Ill. App. 3d
103, 24 Ill. Dec. 674, 385 N.E.2d 815 (5th Dist. 1979).
Statements made by police officers, while interrogating defendant charged with rape, after he had admitted sexual intercourse with complainant, to effect that doctor would confirm fact that complainant had been raped, that fingerprints on complainant's underpants would indicate whether defendant had removed them, and that witnesses had seen defendant leaving parking lot with complainant in his truck, and statement that if defendant went to trial and his use of force had to be proved police officers would not be able to tell court of defendant's cooperation, after which defendant admitted pointing handle of small broom which resembled gun to coerce complainant into his truck, did not invalidate confession. People v. Griffith, 40 Ill. App. 3d 690, 353 N.E.2d 53 (4th Dist. 1976).
Detective's statements to defendant that multiple people had identified defendant as the shooter and that detective believed defendant did not intend to kill were not intentional falsehoods meant to elicit a statement from defendant that would have rendered confession inadmissible; detective was referring to three witnesses whose information had implicated defendant in the crime and the accounts, although not airtight, were enough to form a good faith
basis for detective to assert that he had witnesses to shooting, and detective's belief that defendant did not intentionally kill was a permissible interpretation of facts. Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 2004 WL 1118722 (Ind. 2004).
Police officers had good faith basis for asserting, during interrogation, that defendant's clothing was stained with murder victim's blood, and thus, defendant's confession was voluntary rather than involuntary because of alleged police deception, though officers did not have results of crime laboratory testing at time of interrogation; police had recovered clothing that appeared to be bloodstained and had spoken with witness who had seen defendant changing out of those clothes on the night of the murder. Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 2004 WL 1118728 (Ind. 2004).
Where defendant was under no physical or mental disability and was fully aware of his legal rights, false statement by officer that defendant's daughter had been given lie detector test and that it had shown everything she said to police was truthful did not constitute coercion so as to invalidate defendant's confession to incest charge. State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14 (Iowa 1974).
Officers' misrepresentations of their motivations and the evidence against a defendant do not make a confession involuntary so long as the defendant's statements were the product of his or her free and independent will. State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 116, 977 P.2d 941 (1999).
Fact that detective interrogating murder suspect lied to suspect, telling him police had more information than they actually had, did not make otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible. State v. Strauch, 239 Kan. 203, 718 P.2d 613 (1986).
Evidence supported finding that defendant's statements to investigating agents were voluntary, even though agents misled defendant about strength of evidence against him and made repeated references to defendant's religious faith and its support for confession; defendant was given several breaks during interrogation, defendant was never physically threatened, and defendant joined the religious discussion enthusiastically and urged agents to continue talking to him. U.S. Const. Amend. V. State v. Cobb, 30 Kan. App. 2d 544, 43 P.3d 855 (2002), review denied, (Sept. 24, 2002).
Ruse employed by police, in which they used neighbor's recording of victim's
telephone calls to trick victim's sister-in-law into believing they already had proof of her involvement in murder, did not rise to level of compelling or coercing sister-in-law's confession. Springer v. Com., 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999), as modified, (May 3, 1999).
Defendant's confession to police was voluntary, even though the police used fabricated documents about evidence against him; fabricated handwritten statements that implicated defendant in the murder of victim were used against defendant, the fabrications did not create the appearance of authority, the information in the fabricated statements was mostly true and had been obtained in the course of the police investigation, defendant did not immediately confess after being presented with the fabricated documents, defendant did not confess until he was told that his mother implicated him in the offense, defendant was 26 years old and a high school graduate, he had been advised of his Miranda rights, during his taped statement he stated that he was speaking freely and voluntarily, and the interview lasted only an hour and a half. Lincoln v. State, 164 Md. App. 170, 882 A.2d 944 (2005).
Statement given by defendant after police officer took his shoes, left room with them in order to create impression that his shoe prints had been
identified at scene of crime and later returned to room and made untrue statement to defendant that his shoes appeared to match prints at scene, was properly admitted where claimed deceit only resulted in defendant asking to contact his attorney, which he was allowed to do, after which time he gave statement. Jones v. State, 38 Md. App. 288, 380 A.2d 659 (1977), judgment rev'd on other grounds, 283 Md. 709, 393 A.2d 1372 (1978).
Police officers' display to defendant of falsely labeled blank tape and empty file, and officer's question suggesting that videotape captured defendant at crime scene, which were intended to mislead defendant into believing Commonwealth had evidence against him that it did not have, did not render defendant's subsequent confession involuntary, in prosecution for burning of a dwelling house, as judge properly considered all relevant factors when deciding that confession was voluntarily given. Com. v. DiGiambattista, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 794 N.E.2d 1229 (2003), review granted, 440 Mass. 1106, 799 N.E.2d 593 (2003) and review granted, (Nov. 25, 2003).
Police detectives' implication that they had found defendant's fingerprints in gas station at which armed robbery occurred did not in itself render defendant's confession involuntary, even though detectives knew that none of
fingerprints found in gas station had been identified as defendant's. M.C.L.A. 750.89. People v. Givans, 227 Mich. App. 113, 575 N.W.2d 84 (1997).
In prosecution for first-degree arson, confession was voluntary even though police falsely represented that they had surveillance videotape showing defendant committing arson, where police did have accomplice's statement admitting to arson and identifying defendant as his accomplice, police testified that they wanted to protect identity of informant who had secretly taped accomplice's initial admission, and where defendant was 17 years old at time of interrogation, but had had extensive involvement with juvenile court system, Miranda warnings were properly given, and defendant had been only briefly detained and questioned when he confessed. State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
Trial court in prosecution for attempted murder erred in suppressing defendant's confession based on police officer's falsely telling defendant that his fingerprints had been found on knife, where officer's lie alone did not constitute coercion, particularly in absence of any claim that defendant's will was overborne leading to his confession. State v. Barner, 486 N.W.2d 1
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
False statement by officer that there was eyewitness to crime was not such deception as to render inadmissible confession that was not otherwise false or unworthy. State v. Erks, 214 Neb. 302, 333 N.W.2d 776 (1983).
Police did not coerce confessions from defendant, who was questioned for one to two hours and allowed to speak with his sister when he requested, even if police lied to defendant about strength of evidence against him. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. Silva v. State, 113 Nev. 1365, 951 P.2d 591 (1997).
Fact that three officers interrogated defendant in a confrontational and accusatory manner, lied about having forensic evidence, and referred to concerns about sexually transmitted diseases did not render defendant's confession to having had sexual contact with 13-year-old victim involuntary; there was no evidence that officers' questions were coercive in tone, style, or content, misleading comments about forensic evidence were not so deceptive as to render confession involuntary, and raising concerns about sexually transmitted diseases did not amount to police coercion. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 15. State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 813 A.2d 501 (2002).
Defendant's confession was admissible even though some of interrogator's statements regarding information from an informant that defendant had committed burglary were untrue. State v. Aguirre, 91 N.M. 672, 579 P.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1978).
Deception employed by interrogating police officer in getting defendant to confess to rape of 13-year-old girl, namely officer's false representation to defendant that victim had identified defendant as the perpetrator and had taken, and passed, a voice stress test, was neither so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process nor accompanied by a threat or promise which induced a false confession, such as would warrant suppression of confession. U.S. Const. Amend. 14. People v. Henderson, 4 A.D.3d 616, 772 N.Y.S.2d 120, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 1062, 2004 WL 314296 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2004), leave to appeal denied (N.Y. May 28, 2004).
Voluntariness of confession was not impugned by misrepresentations by assistant district attorney that conversation with accused had been recorded. People v. Caserino, 16 N.Y.2d 255, 265 N.Y.S.2d 644, 212 N.E.2d 884 (1965).
In prosecution for second-degree murder, denial of motion to suppress statements made by defendant to law enforcement officials was proper even though investigator from district attorney's office falsely informed defendant during questioning that blood found on his pants had been analyzed and found to be same type as that of victim when results were not yet available; ruse did not render defendant's statements involuntary, where defendant was subject to continuous questioning from time he was first read his rights, and therefore, additional warnings were unnecessary, and where evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. People v. Hassell, 180 A.D.2d 819, 580 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dep't 1992).
In prosecution for murder, defendant's confession, made at precinct station to which defendant had come voluntarily, and given after detectives accused defendant of lying and told him, even though it was untrue, that police had found defendant's fingerprints on evidence, was not inadmissible, where environment in which confession was made was not so coercive as to render confession involuntary. People v. Spellman, 168 A.D.2d 318, 562 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1st Dep't 1990).
Defendant's confession to possession of controlled substance was voluntary and
admissible in evidence notwithstanding that defendant was told during questioning that he and codefendant had been under surveillance and that codefendant was cooperating, neither of which statements were true, where statements were hardly type that would induce false confession, and where no promises were made other than vague statement that it would be in defendant's best interest to cooperate. People v. Jackson, 143 A.D.2d 471, 532 N.Y.S.2d 808 (3d Dep't 1988).
Where police with one exception accurately described to defendant who was charged with manslaughter various pieces of evidence that they had accumulated against him, one false statement did not invalidate defendant's confession as having been induced by trickery. People v. Calhoun, 78 A.D.2d 658, 432 N.Y.S.2d 226 (2d Dep't 1980).
Defendant's confession to law enforcement officers as to drugs in jail was made voluntarily, even though defendant claimed that she was under influence of heroin at time of interview and that she was promised leniency if she cooperated, and officers misled defendant by telling her that her friend's fingerprints were on heroin packets in envelope and that drug-sniffing dog had discovered heroin; defendant exhibited no outward signs of intoxication and did
not tell officers that she had ingested heroin, officers denied making promise of leniency, defendant was 22 years old with some college experience, interview was no longer than 90 minutes, and defendant waived her Miranda rights. State v. Klapka, 2004-Ohio-2921, 2004 WL 1238411 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. Lake County 2004).
Confession by murder defendant was voluntarily obtained, even though police had misled defendant as to the strength of the evidence against him, where defendant went to police station voluntarily, was interrogated for only 12 minutes before confessing, was in his late twenties and had been arrested before, there was no evidence of physical abuse or deprivation, and defendant heard and waived his Miranda rights. State v. Bays, 87 Ohio St. 3d 15, 1999- Ohio-216, 716 N.E.2d 1126 (1999).
Where before making statement in question defendant was readvised of his Miranda rights and waived them after he initiated conversation with officer by informing latter of his true name, defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights even though question which elicited statement defendant sought to suppress probably was designed to suggest falsely that defendant's fingerprints had been found on the gun. State v. Bonner, 49 Or. App. 849, 621 P.2d 87
In prosecution for murder and related crimes, totality of circumstances demonstrated that defendant, after considering his options, knowingly waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed details of crime to police even though he alleged that police isolated him and deceived him by telling him that he had been seen with victim the night she was murdered, that his tires and shoes matched impressions and prints found at murder scene, and that they had irrefutable DNA evidence establishing his guilt, where police did not coerce defendant or threaten him with adverse consequences if he did not cooperate, room where he was questioned was comfortable, he was not deprived of necessities, and he was repeatedly read his Miranda rights. State v. Register, 323 S.C. 471, 476 S.E.2d 153 (1996).
Officer's deception in telling defendant that his mother and grandmother were "across the hall" and that both had stated that defendant had stabbed the victim did not render defendant's confession involuntary, where defendant insisted that he did not commit the stabbing, and maintained that because his mother was the victim's girlfriend, he would expect that she would side with the victim. U.S. Const. Amend. V. State v. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, 650 N.W.2d
20 (S.D. 2002).
When considered together, the police deception about the strength of their case, their statements about possible penalties, their suggestion that murder defendant talk to his mother, and their statement that defendant had to tell them everything did not render defendant's statements involuntary; entire interview revealed that defendant voluntarily participated with officer, that defendant's confession was the product of his own balancing of competing considerations, and that his will was not overborne by the detective's tactics. State v. Owens, 2002 SD 42, 643 N.W.2d 735 (S.D. 2002).
Defendant failed to establish that his confession was involuntary, despite his claims that he was considered possible participant in murder, was assured he would be "walking out" of police station after questioning, was provided with false representations regarding what others had said, and was told he could not see his girlfriend until he told the truth, after which he could begin new life with her; defendant showed substantial capacity to resist police pressure, at no time were threats made for his statements, and no promises were made in exchange for his statements. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14; Const. Art. 6, 9. State v. Smith, 1998 SD 6, 573 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1998).
Fact that police officers misrepresented to defendant charged with murder of child that polygraph test and tests of defendant's clothing showed he was lying and that a rock used to kill victim had his fingerprints on it, while relevant in viewing totality of circumstances, was not sufficient to invalidate or render inadmissible defendant's otherwise competent confession. McGee v. State, 2 Tenn. Crim. App. 100, 451 S.W.2d 709 (1969).
In prosecution for capital murder, misrepresentation by police officer during interrogation that there was eyewitness to murder did not render defendant's subsequent confession to murder involuntary, where police conduct was not so coercive that it overbore defendant's will, rendering confession involuntary, where officer's statement directly related to defendant's guilt, where defendant was 18 years old at time of confession and was "street sophisticated youth" who had prior experience with criminal justice system, and where defendant repeatedly received Miranda warnings. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Officer's exaggeration of medical evidence against defendant for offense of sexual assault of a child did not render defendant's confession involuntary.
Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2003), petition for discretionary review refused, (2 pets.)(June 30, 2004).
In murder prosecution, defendant's confession was not rendered involuntary due to fact that interrogating officers falsely stated to defendant that victim identified defendant as assailant on deathbed and that such declaration would be admissible against defendant, where false information was small part of overall interrogation scheme in which officers several times over made certain that defendant knew and understood his statutory Miranda warnings. Rodriquez v. State, 934 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. App. Waco 1996).
Fact that police informed defendant during first interview that he was being questioned only as witness, and falsely informed him during subsequent interview that they had information that accomplice had killed homicide victim, and that they had enough information from another person to charge defendant with capital murder, did not render his subsequent confession inadmissible in evidence where method used was not calculated to produce untruthful confession and was not offensive to due process. Snow v. State, 721 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1986).
Police officer's misrepresentation to defendant, which consisted of telling defendant during interview that police were in possession of mall surveillance videotapes that contained footage of defendant at scene, when in fact no such footage existed, was not sufficiently egregious to overcome defendant's free will and render his confession involuntary; both references to nonexistent videotapes occurred early in interview and confession did not occur until later stages of questioning, which suggested that misrepresentations did not overcome defendant's free will and yield confession, and there was significant other evidence of defendant's guilt. State v. Werner, 2003 UT App 268, 76 P.3d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
In prosecution for capital murder, robbery, and burglary, trial court did not err in refusing to suppress defendant's confession, where although defendant contended that his confession was inadmissible since it was obtained as result of "lie" by police officer in describing development of "Retinal Image Machine," which officer said would reflect "last impression or vision" that dead person had seen, officer's uncontradicted testimony was that defendant did not react to story about machine, and officer testified that defendant did not admit that he had killed victim until nearly hour after story, when defendant was advised of information that police possessed and of possibility that he
would be charged with capital murder. Swann v. Com., 247 Va. 222, 441 S.E.2d 195 (1994).
Defendant's statement confessing to arson was freely and voluntarily given, though trooper previously informed defendant that video surveillance equipment may have been put in place prior to fire and though defendant had been known to abuse prescription drugs, where defendant went to police station on her own, trooper informed her that he wished to ask her some questions about fire and murder, after which he read defendant her Miranda rights and informed her that she was not under arrest and was free to leave any time, defendant acknowledged her rights and signed a waiver form, and trooper testified that defendant was not intoxicated and that videotapes were not placed in room to create anxiety in defendant. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. State v. Milburn, 204 W. Va. 203, 511 S.E.2d 828 (1998).
Misrepresentations by police officers that they had more evidence against defendant linking him to murders than they actually had, and statement made while showing defendant fingerprint card and wallet, that "this is what's going to pin you down," did not create such pressure on defendant so as to overcome his free will or to render his waiver of his right to remain silent
involuntary, where misrepresentations were not of type that would have created pressure sufficient to overbear defendant's will, or to have impaired his ability to make free and reasoned choice, and where there was nothing in nature of misrepresentations, implicit or in fact, to have led defendant to have believed that it might have been necessary to waive his right to silence in order to benefit or protect himself or to protect another he would have had reason to want to protect. State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).
9[b] Pretending to have evidence against accused, generally--Confession held inadmissible
Where accused, during a rigorous examination by police officers, was informed by the officers that a stone which he threw had hit and killed the deceased,
and the accused thereupon wrote a letter to his father in which he asked for assistance and admitted the alleged facts as to the killing, but there was at this time actually no evidence to the effect that the stone which the accused had thrown had hit the deceased, it was held in People v McCullough (1890) 81 Mich 25, 45 NW 515, that the letter was not admissible in evidence. The court said that where confessions are voluntarily made and no threats are made or inducements held out to obtain a confession, they may be used in evidence against the accused, but that they must be voluntary and without any influence being exerted by the officer, either of threats, promises, artifice, or duress. It should be noted that in its opinion the court stressed the fact that the accused before writing the letter was exposed to "a rigorous system of examination and cross-examination."
A confession induced by the prosecutor by his false statement to the accused that he knew all about his alleged guilt, was held involuntary in State v Brockman (1870) 46 Mo 566, on the ground that under the circumstances such statement was likely to produce fear and intimidation. After stating that, considering the relative situation of the parties, it would be preposterous to say that the prosecutor's statement was not calculated to produce fear and intimidation in the defendant, the court said: "This was surely not a voluntary confession; it was superinduced by resorting to a false pretext, and setting a
trap to catch the unwary. Such a practice cannot be endured."
Where the owner of stolen goods sent word to the defendant that he had better come down and settle, pretending that he had been seen taking the property, and that it would be better for him to come in and tell what he got and pay for the goods, and that unless he did, he would be prosecuted, and the defendant thereupon confessed, it was held in Cook v State (1893) 32 Tex Crim 27, 22 SW 23, that the confession was involuntary. The court said that the defendant, misled by the statement, which was untrue, that he had been seen taking the goods and would be prosecuted if he did not settle at once, became extremely anxious to stop the prosecution and settled at a price below a felony theft and that for this reason the confession was not voluntary and should have been excluded.
See United States ex rel. Everett v Murphy (1964, CA2 NY) 329 F2d 68, supra 9[a].
The following additional authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this section:
Confession was not voluntary where defendant was young man of average intelligence, who did not complete high school, and who had never before been arrested, detained, or questioned by police, initial questioning was conducted by arresting officer in parked police car with another marked police car positioned near passenger side of car and uniformed policeman standing directly outside door on passenger side of police car, officer was much larger and more experienced in such matters than defendant, officer stated and reiterated during questioning that he was only person standing between defendant and long jail term, intimating that, if defendant should cooperate, officer would protect him from going to jail, and, although Miranda warnings were given, they were vitiated by context of combining warning of right to remain silent with use of intimidation and promises to induce breaking of silence. U.S. v. Pinto, 671 F. Supp. 41 (D. Me. 1987).
Admission in evidence of incriminating statements made by defendant to police interrogators was reversible error in murder prosecution where record indicated police planted in defendant's mind the suspicion that he was mentally ill,
where statements were preceded by admitted police deception regarding existence of conclusive eyewitness proof of his guilt, and where statements were series of emotional outbursts and not reliable product of rational intellect. People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93 (1982) (disapproved of on other grounds by, People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865 (1991)).
Police fabrication of scientific reports indicating that semen stains on victim's underwear came from defendant and using them to induce 19-year-old defendant to confess to sexually assaulting and smothering his five-year-old niece violated defendant's due process rights under federal and state constitutions. State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989).
Defendant's written confession to arson was coerced and should have been suppressed where defendant was 15-year-old in ninth grade, attending alternative school because he had received failing grades in junior high school, defendant was taken to police station alone in squad car, he was not accompanied by his parents or attorney during interrogation at police station, although defendant was initially informed he was free to go, he did not really
believe that was true, defendant was falsely informed that certain pieces of evidence which were sent to crime lab would link him with fire, that certain witnesses would testify to his involvement in fire, that officer had videotape of him entering and exiting trailer that burned, and that, if he cooperated he would not be arrested, but would just be taken up to jail, booked, and released, defendant testified that he admitted to crime so officer would quit bothering him about it and because he didn't want to go to jail, defendant was not given Miranda warnings until after his full oral admission and after he was asked to submit typed statement, and defendant's warned written statement given immediately after his unwarned oral statement was mere reiteration of oral statement. In Interest of T.S., 151 Ill. App. 3d 344, 104 Ill. Dec. 264, 502 N.E.2d 761 (4th Dist. 1986).
Defendant's confession to rape was involuntary and inadmissible in evidence where defendant was positively told that his fingerprints had been found in complainant's apartment. People v. Lee, 128 Ill. App. 3d 774, 84 Ill. Dec. 38, 471 N.E.2d 567 (1st Dist. 1984), aff'd and remanded, 111 Ill. 2d 454, 95 Ill. Dec. 835, 490 N.E.2d 688 (1986).
Defendant's confession to armed robbery given during police interrogation was
involuntary under totality of circumstances; defendant had low IQ of 76 and was susceptible to being overcome by anxiety, officers repeatedly used false information that fingerprints were found at scene of robbery and confirmed to be defendant's, officers threatened to tell county attorney of defendant's lack of cooperation, and record clearly showed that defendant's numerous changes in story, whether in denial or in confession, usually occurred shortly after officers lied to or threatened him. State v. Swanigan, 106 P.3d 39 (Kan. 2005).
Defendant's confession to burning of dwelling house was not voluntary, in view of interrogating officers' use of trickery by presenting defendant with fake videotape and documentary evidence suggesting the strength of Commonwealth's case, officers' minimization of crime by stating that his conduct was understandable, justifiable, and not serious, and their repeated references to defendant's need for "counseling," in manner implicitly suggesting to defendant that confession would result in lenient disposition. Com. v. Digiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 813 N.E.2d 516 (2004).
Although police officer's incorrect statement to murder suspect that he had been positively identified by two reliable witnesses in company of victim did
not itself render suspect's confession involuntary, officer's deception, when coupled with promise of favorable treatment and suspect's youth and drugged condition, was sufficient to render confession inadmissible. Com. v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 387 N.E.2d 527 (1979).
In prosecution for incest, trial court committed reversible error in denying father's motion to suppress evidence of admission of inappropriately touching daughter approximately one year earlier while living in state of Washington, where by time father confessed to Washington crime he had been awake for more 30 hours, separated from his children, and lied to about evidence against him. State v. Mayes, 251 Mont. 358, 825 P.2d 1196 (1992).
Where police took position that they had conclusive evidence of defendant's guilt and indicated that he would go to hospital, not to jail, defendant's confession was not voluntary and was not admissible. People v. Sunset Bay, 76 A.D.2d 592, 430 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1st Dep't 1980).
In prosecution for aggravated assault, evidence was sufficient for court to find that investigators induced defendant's confession by use of threats, implied promises, and deprivation of legal counsel; defendant asked police at
least three times to make telephone call and police continued interrogation knowing defendant's lawyer was waiting to see him, where police advised defendant that he needed medical attention and that they would provide it, in lieu of criminal prosecution, if he cooperated and "told the truth", and in face of continued denial of guilt, police raised their voices, angrily told him he had lied, and repeatedly indicated that they had sufficient witnesses and evidence to convict him for fire, as well as others, and so did not need a guilty admission. State v. Wright, 67 Ohio App. 3d 574, 587 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1990).
Where only evidence against defendant, aside from confession, was that he was with co-defendant on evening of crime, statement of sheriff after defendant indicated he wanted to talk to lawyer, stating that sheriff had evidence, that truck involved would be checked out, and that he did not have to question defendant were made to induce defendant to relinquish right to counsel and were not based on hard evidence, and confession would be suppressed. State v. Howard, 617 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
10 Pretending that accomplice incriminated accused or had confessed
A false statement by a police officer, made to a defendant accused of murder, that his accomplice had confessed was held in Osborn v People (1927) 83 Colo 4, 262 P 892, not to render defendant's subsequent confession inadmissible. The court said that it always has been universally conceded that the use of a trick or fraud, however reprehensible in itself, does not of itself exclude a confession obtained by means of it.
Rejecting the assertion that because a police officer represented to defendant in a murder prosecution that certain parties connected with the affair had made statements and were under arrest, and these untrue statements induced the defendant to confess, the confession was involuntary and so inadmissible, the court in State v Palko (1936) 121 Conn 669, 186 A 657, held that the confession was nevertheless admissible, since the object of evidence is to get at the truth and a trick which has no tendency to produce a confession, except one in accordance with the truth, is always admissible. In support of its
holding, the court cited Commonwealth v Cressinger (1899) 193 Pa 326, 44 A 433, supra 9[a].
In State v Fortner (1876) 43 Iowa 494, it appeared that defendant was jointly indicted with another person for larceny. Defendant was put on trial alone and a witness for the prosecution testified that he had visited defendant in jail and had told him falsely that his associate had turned state's evidence against him, that the accomplice was just as guilty as defendant was, and that he should turn state's evidence against his accomplice. Witness also told defendant that if he had all the property stolen from him and would pay for it, he then would clear him. Defendant thereupon stated that he had stolen nothing from the witness, but that he and the accomplice had stolen property from the prosecuting witness. Holding that the above testimony was properly admitted in evidence, the court stated that the mere fact that the witness had told the defendant that his associate had turned state's evidence against him was not sufficient to exclude the confession, no promises having been made to the defendant to induce him to confess having stolen the property of the prosecuting witness.
The same has been held as to statements made by a woman incriminating her husband and sons, where it appeared that the statements were procured by falsely representing to her that the husband and sons had confessed.
Wigginton v Commonwealth (1891) 92 Ky 282, 17 SW 634.
The reception in evidence of statements containing admissions made by defendant in a murder prosecution to police officers after the officers had attempted to convince him, perhaps successfully, by a pretended telegram from a chief of police in another city that an accomplice had confessed and had accused the defendant of the actual shooting, was held in Commonwealth v Green (1939) 302 Mass 547, 20 NE2d 417, to have been proper. Referring to Commonwealth v Flood (1890) 152 Mass 529, 25 NE 971, as authority, the court stated that there is no rule of law that an admission or even a confession is inadmissible in evidence because induced by a ruse or deception.
On the question whether a confession induced by the suspicion that an accomplice had made certain statements, and that for that reason the accused might as well tell the truth is voluntary, the fact that the accomplice may not have made the statement was held in State v Jones (1874) 54 Mo 478, to be immaterial, since a confession is not involuntary merely because obtained by artifice.
And although the sheriff may have led the accused to believe that the latter's accomplice had betrayed him, a confession in consequence of such belief is not thereby made incompetent. State v Rush (1888) 95 Mo 199, 8 SW 221.
Similarly, leading the defendant to believe that his confederate had confessed
was held in State v Wilson (1903) 172 Mo 420, 72 SW 696, not to render a confession of the accused involuntary.
In McIntosh v State (1920) 105 Neb 328, 180 NW 573, 12 ALR 798, it appeared that while the accused, who was charged with cattle stealing, was being returned to the state and before he had made any statement, the sheriff told him that his accomplice had made an affidavit and that the accomplice "was not playing square with him," the sheriff stating on cross-examination that these statements were made for the purpose of getting the accused to talk. After these conversations the accused made several admissions, admitted his guilt, and gave the details of the crime. Holding that accused's admissions of guilt were properly admitted in evidence, the court stated that the action by the sheriff was a species of deception which, while hardly commendable, does not make the subsequent admissions of the accused inadmissible.
The mere fact that the officer having the custody of the accused falsely assured him that an alleged accomplice had "blowed upon him," and would testify as to his guilt, was held in Price v State (1868) 18 Ohio St 418, not to render a confession afterward made involuntary, since it had no tendency to make the accused swerve from the truth. The court specifically pointed out that nothing was said or done which was calculated to induce a hope of advantage from confession or fear of harm from its refusal.
Citing a number of cases from various jurisdictions, the court in State v Goldizen (1923) 93 W Va 328, 116 SE 687, held that where the accused has been told that an accomplice has made a confession and implicated him, and as a result thereof the prisoner makes a statement confessing the crime, it does not render such statement inadmissible even though the information given the accused was not true. The court based its decision on the ground that the theory is that confessions which are obtained by artifice without threat or promise are likely to be true, supposing there is nothing in the artifice calculated to produce an untrue confession.
Voluntary confessions made by a prisoner in custody on the charge of assault with intent to kill, in reference to the key of the victim's house and in reference to the club which the prisoner said he had used in making the assault, and admissions of guilt made by the prisoner during conversations with his father and his codefendant, were held in Rex v White (1908) 18 Ont L 640, not to be rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that such confessions and admissions were the result of a false statement made by a police officer to the defendant that his codefendant had "done some talking" about the matter. The court said that the evidence was properly admitted even though it might be assumed that the prisoner's confessions or admissions may have been in some degree influenced by the officer's misstatement, and that the weight to be
attached to them was a matter for the consideration of the jury under all the circumstances.
To the same effect, see also: State v Fortner (1876) 43 Iowa 494; Fife v Commonwealth (1857) 29 Pa 429.
The following additional authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this section:
Defendant's confession was not involuntary notwithstanding his statement to the police that he thought he should get a lawyer and notwithstanding police told him falsely that his associate had confessed, since defendant had received partial warnings of his constitutional rights before making incriminating statements, questioning lasted only slightly more than one hour, and defendant was mature individual of normal intelligence. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S. Ct. 1420, 22 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1969).
Defendant's confession to participation in murder was rendered involuntary by conduct of police officer where defendant, then few days short of his sixteenth birthday, was stopped by police 5-1/2 hours earlier, was taken in police vehicle to precinct where he was subjected to continuous interrogation by two detectives for four hours, was never informed that he was free to leave, was not advised of any of his constitutional rights, was not accompanied by counsel, friends, or family, was told by police officer that one of his friends had already confessed to murder and was "burying" defendant and his brother and that defendant should therefore "bury" his friend, which statement was untrue, and was told by police officer that nothing would happen to him because of his youth. Quartararo v. Mantello, 715 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. N.Y. 1989), judgment aff'd without op, 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1989).
State court did not violate defendant's constitutional rights in admitting into evidence confession which he had made after police detectives falsely stated to him that an accomplice had indicated that defendant had actually committed murder. U.S. ex rel. Brandon v. LaVallee, 391 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
Confession would be suppressed where, inter alia, police told defendant that co-participant had accused him of shooting victim of robbery, police presented defendant with spurious confession supposedly given by co-participant, and police told defendant only way he could "avoid having a rope put around his neck" was by acknowledging his role and clearing himself of charge of shooting, where crime was felony murder and it was irrelevant who did shooting. Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. N.Y. 1978).
Court would affirm conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. 846, notwithstanding defendant's contention that her custodial admissions had not been freely and voluntarily made because she had "requested" attorney, and because her free will had been overcome by interrogation tactics of certain detective; even assuming that detective had lied to defendant about her codefendant's statement and had accused defendant of lying, detective's actions were "not so extraordinary or egregious as to warrant a finding that they overbore the defendant's will." U.S. v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379, 115 A.L.R. Fed. 749 (10th Cir. 1990).
Actions of detective in misrepresenting that codefendant had confessed and
implicated defendant, pounding his fists on table and calling defendant liar, and informing defendant that she would be charged by magistrate on following day, with or without attorney, were not so extraordinary or egregious as to warrant finding that they overbore defendant's will and rendered her confession involuntary. U.S. v. Hill, 701 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Kan. 1988), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1379, 115 A.L.R. Fed. 749 (10th Cir. 1990).
Deceptive bluff by police interviewing 19-year-old, emotionally disturbed murder suspect of low intelligence, to effect that police suspected latent fingerprint lifted from crime scene belonged to suspect, was not so coercive as to render confession involuntary, and was not such artifice as would have tendency to produce untruthful confession. Sovalik v. State, 612 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1980) (citing annotation).
Although Court of Appeals would not condone certain tactics used by police and such tactics made case close one, totality of circumstances supported trial judge's finding that defendant's confession was voluntary notwithstanding use of deception and trickery by police during interrogation. Suggestions by police that kidnapping charge might be dropped and that defendant might be able to plead guilty to second-degree murder if he told truth were not sufficiently
critical to have overborne defendant's ability to make free and voluntary confession where officers repeatedly stressed to defendant that all they could really do was report his cooperation to United States Attorney's office. Similarly, misleading statements by officers concerning strength of evidence against defendant, such as false statements that defendant's fingerprints had been found in decedent's car and that one victim and at least one other witness could identify defendant as assailant were not shown to have been sufficient to coerce false confession where defendant steadfastly denied any involvement in kidnapping and homicide and for over one hour maintained that man named "Butch" had committed and crime and "set up" defendant, and at pretrial hearing defendant did not claim to have been influenced by officers' statements, but claimed to have confessed because of beating police had given him, which claim trial judge wholly rejected. Beasley v. U.S., 512 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 1986).
In juvenile court robbery prosection, defendant's constitutional rights were not violated by admission into evidence of confession he made after police falsely stated to him that his fingerprints had been found on stolen purse, and that crime victim had identified him as her assailant. Matter of D. A. S., 391 A.2d 255 (D.C. 1978).
Finding that defendant's confession was voluntary based on totality of circumstances was supported by evidence that hospitalized defendant was alert, awake, and oriented as to time, place, and circumstances, and that defendant received Miranda warnings, despite claim that police detectives deluded defendant before he gave his statements by falsely stating they had obtained physical evidence and by failing to inform him that he could be sentenced to death. Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997) (abrogated on other grounds by, Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2001)).
Admitting incriminatory statement into evidence was not error, even though statement was made in response to false suggestion by police officer that codefendant had indicated that maker of statement was brains of whole thing. Jacobs v. State, 133 Ga. App. 812, 212 S.E.2d 468 (1975).
Confession of defendant convicted of having sexual intercourse with mentally retarded woman was not rendered involuntary because during interview police purported to have evidence of sexual activity that incriminated defendant and falsely stated that there were bruises on complainant's arms and legs indicating that force had been used, where rule regarding use of deliberate falsehoods by police required that falsehoods intrinsic to facts of alleged
offense would be treated as one of totality of circumstances surrounding confession; in this case deliberate misrepresentations were intrinsic and, from totality of circumstances, were not of type that would reasonably induce false confession. State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 849 P.2d 58 (1993).
Defendant's confession to murder and rape was not invalidated because it was induced by interrogator's false statement that confession implicating defendant had been obtained from accomplice where, prior to statement by interrogator, defendant had already incriminated himself by admitting that he was present when decedent was killed. People v. Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 103 Ill. Dec. 186, 501 N.E.2d 207 (2d Dist. 1986).
It was not unconstitutional act of subterfuge for police, looking for vehicle involved in armed robbery, to inform person to whom license number was registered that her vehicle had been involved in hit-and-run accident, and even if it had been defendant had no standing to suppress his subsequent confession, since subterfuge was not directed against him; co-defendants were similarly without standing to suppress their own confessions on ground that their arrests resulted indirectly from subterfuge complained of by first defendant; defendant who had confessed after being falsely informed by police that co-defendant had
made statement implicating him was not entitled to suppress confession, where he had been admonished as to his rights and had not been subjected to physical abuse, threats or promises. People v. Houston, 36 Ill. App. 3d 695, 344 N.E.2d 641 (1st Dist. 1976).
Even if statement made to defendant by police before he confessed that accomplice had implicated him were untrue, confession would not have been involuntary. Estep v. State, 271 Ind. 525, 394 N.E.2d 111 (1979) (overruled on other grounds by, Jones v. State, 438 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 1982)).
Where police officer falsely told defendant that his accomplice had incriminated him, deceptive statement was insufficient to render confession inadmissible. Ward v. State, 408 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1980).
Trial court did not err in admitting defendant's confession as voluntarily given upon reasonably concluding that police officer had told defendant nothing other than what defendant's companions had told him and, thus, that police officer had not used artifice, deception, trickery or fraud to induce defendant's confession. Swaney v. State, 176 Ind. App. 114, 374 N.E.2d 554 (1st Dist. 1978).
Statement by one officer to suspect's interrogating officer (overheard by suspect) that a co-suspect in savage knifing-homicide "had not passed a polygraph examination" was not such subterfuge as to render suspect's confession shortly thereafter inadmissible as evidence of guilt at trial. State v. Churchill, 231 Kan. 408, 646 P.2d 1049 (1982).
Where defendant and another person had been arrested by police in truck believed to be stolen, were taken to police station where defendant stated he wanted to see attorney and refused to sign waiver form, defendant then saw other arrested person at desk writing and assumed he was making confession, whereupon defendant reinitiated communication with police officers who repeated warning of his rights, after which defendant confessed to murder of which police were unaware, confession was not result of police trickery. State v. Gervais, 531 So. 2d 555 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1251 (La. 1989).
Where, despite fact that defendant arrested for murder had invoked right to remain silent, police officer continued to talk with him and falsely informed him that girlfriend had given statement implicating her in crime, and where
defendant immediately thereafter informed police that he would make statement, police officer's deception tricked suspect into waiver of rights, and confession was inadmissible. Com. v. Jackson, 377 Mass. 319, 386 N.E.2d 15 (1979).
Trial court in rape prosecution did not err in rejecting defendant's contention that his confession was involuntary, because interrogating officer lied by telling defendant that accomplice had confessed and that defendant believed his statement was given in exchange for implied promise of drug treatment, where there was no indication that defendant was led to believe that he would not be prosecuted for rape if he confessed; defendant had extensive prior experience with criminal justice system, interrogation was relatively short and defendant made no claim that he was intoxicated or threatened, and although defendant may have been led to expect that he would receive treatment, he was not led to expect that treatment would be instead of prosecution and punishment. State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 1995).
Record supported finding that defendant's confession to murder was voluntary, despite claim that it stemmed from deputy's telling him day before, in violation of his right to lawyer's assistance, that his co-defendant had
confessed and had implicated defendant in murder; evidence indicated that defendant initiated conversation with deputy day before defendant confessed, and on day of confession defendant asked his stepfather to ask deputy to come to jail to talk to defendant, deputy advised defendant of his rights before beginning conversation and again before taking confession, and defendant assured deputy each time that he wanted to waive his rights. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6; V.A.M.S. Const. Art. 1, 18(a). State v. Holman, 965 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1998).
Statements made by defendant were admissible even if interrogating officer had in fact deceived defendant by telling him that other persons had implicated him. State v. Stubenrauch, 503 S.W.2d 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
Deception of police in telling arson defendant that co-defendant had told them truth about origin of fire did not render defendant's confession inadmissible, where there was no evidence of any threats or coercion and no evidence that form of deception suggested answer. State v. Stevenson, 200 Neb. 624, 264 N.W.2d 848 (1978).
Although police falsely informed defendant, before obtaining his confession,
that coperpetrator had implicated him in burglary, that ruse was not so fundamentally unfair as to deny defendant due process of law, nor was conduct of officers so egregious as to render confession involuntary. People v. Ingram, 208 A.D.2d 561, 616 N.Y.S.2d 780 (2d Dep't 1994).
Deception practiced by police officers in confronting defendant with false confession of another suspect and its threatened use against defendant, while not approved by court, did not render defendant's subsequent confession inadmissible. People v. Robinson, 31 A.D.2d 724, 297 N.Y.S.2d 82 (4th Dep't 1968).
Defendant was not shown to have been tricked into making statement to police where bulk of testimony of police officers at voir dire was that detective had told defendant that accomplice had made statement which implicated defendant, and that defendant then began to cry and confessed forthwith, and only testimony that accomplice had confessed and implicated defendant was in response to question by defense counsel which used those terms, and thus was suggested by defense counsel rather than witness. State v. Martin, 315 N.C. 667, 340 S.E.2d 326 (1986).
Trial judge did not err in admitting defendant's confession in evidence in murder trial, even though confession was induced by interrogating police officer's statement to defendant that codefendant had made statement implicating defendant when no such statement had been made. State v. Harvill, 15 Ohio App. 3d 94, 472 N.E.2d 743 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1984).
Defendant's confession was admissible where alleged fabrication concerning codefendant's confession was not likely to cause untrustworthy confession by defendant, nor was such fabrication so reprehensible as to invalidate confession as offensive to basic notions of fairness. Com. v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423, 322 A.2d 119 (1974) (citing annotation).
Fact that defendant's father, at direction of police, stated falsely to defendant that accomplice had confessed to murder and had implicated defendant did not render defendant's subsequent confession involuntary where misrepresentation had occurred only once after full Miranda warnings had been given, and questioning was of short duration. State v. Worley, 179 W. Va. 403, 369 S.E.2d 706 (1988).
In first-degree murder prosecution during which trial court determined that
defendant's confession was motivated by interrogator telling the then suspect that his fingerprint had been found on blood-covered knife, a circumstance which could only have occurred while blood was wet, court ruled that confession was not induced by deliberate deceit or misrepresentation even though state was unable to verify fingerprint identification. Wagner v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 70, 277 N.W.2d 849 (1979).
Where interrogating officer merely speculated on possibility that homicide suspect's fingerprints would be found on victim's wallet, defense contention that waiver of Miranda rights prior to suspect's oral admission was not voluntary because officer's comments about wallet were for purpose of tricking defendant into confession was without merit. Schilling v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 69, 271 N.W.2d 631 (1978).
11 Pretending that accomplice was apprehended
A confession induced by the false statement of the officer having the prisoner in charge that his supposed accomplice had been taken and shot, was held in King v State (1867) 40 Ala 314, to be admissible, since a confession is admissible although obtained by artifice or deception.
It was stated, by way of dictum, in State v Fredericks (1884) 85 Mo 145, that is well settled that a confession is not rendered inadmissible because made under the supposition that the accomplice of the party making it was in custody, when in fact he was not, although the impression that the accomplice was in custody was created by artifice, with a view to obtaining the confession, unless the artifice used was calculated to produce an untrue confession.
12 Pretending that evidence favorable to accused was nonexistent, generally
Where, in a prosecution for grand larceny of a cow, defendant confessed after he had been erroneously informed by officers that the stock inspector did not have any bill of sale for the cow alleged to have been stolen and which defendant had sold, it was held in State v Rossell (1942) 113 Mont 457, 127 P2d 379, that the admission of the confession in evidence was not error even though the defendant by the above information was led to believe that his
principal defense, based on claim of ownership, was lost, in view of the fact that other evidence produced by the state was consistent with the statements made by the defendant in confessing the crime. After stating that the test to be applied in determining whether a confession of one on trial for crime made while in custody and asserted to have been made under inducement is whether the inducement held out to the accused was such as to create a fair risk of a false confession, the court said that in the present case it appeared that if the defendant was innocent and did in fact buy this animal from another by way of a bill of sale, he would steadfastly maintain his innocence with the knowledge that the bill of sale would protect him, because he knew that there was a bill of sale even though it was reported to him that it was nonexistent.
13 Withholding information from accused
A case in which the withholding of information from the accused was likened to those cases in which false information was knowlingly given to him is State v Malm (1955) 142 Conn 113, 111 A2d 685. It appeared in this case that the police officer who questioned the accused, who was charged with murder in the
first degree, failed to disclose to the accused that a third person had made admissions concerning the same crime. Rejecting the assertion that the failure to disclose this knowledge to the accused bore upon the voluntary aspect of the confession made by the accused, the court stated that the police officer was under no duty to disclose to the accused any knowledge he might have concerning the admissions made by the third person. Referring to State v Palko (1936) 121 Conn 669, 186 A 657, stated supra 10, the court added that withholding information concerning other persons who might be involved in the investigation of a crime is no different in kind from the giving of false information concerning them and that the latter conduct, while not commended, does not render a confession involuntary. The court made it clear that failure to give the accused the information discussed above could have no bearing on the truthfulness of his confession, by adding that if the officer's knowledge had been divulged to the accused it might be that he would not have confessed, in the hope that the crime would be laid at another's door and that he would escape, and that, viewed from this angle, the failure to divulge the information could have no bearing whatever upon the question whether the accused's confessions were vountary.
Another case involving the claim that information had been withheld from the accused is Commonwealth v Johnson (1953) 372 Pa 266, 93 A2d 691, cert den
345 US 959, 97 L ed 1379, 73 S Ct 944. Defendant, who was indicted under a statute making the wilful and malicious removal of rails of a railroad a felony, argued that confessions made by him were obtained through trickery and artifice in that he was not told of the fact that the displacement of the rails had resulted in the death of the engineer and the fireman of the train. Holding that the confession was admissible, the court said that even though the defendant might not have confessed had he known of the deaths, this fact did not affect or detract from the truthfulness of his admission that he displaced the rail; that it was not claimed that the police officers or the district attorney made any misrepresentations to him concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime; that the complaint was only that he was not told of the seriousness of the offense as to which he was being questioned; and that even if this were deemed artifice, it manifestly was not designed or calculated to obtain an untrue confession, and a confession obtained by trick which has no tendency to produce a confession except one in accordance with the truth is admissible.
For another case involving the withholding of information from the defendant, see also People v Everett (1962) 10 NY2d 500, 225 NYS2d 193, 180 NE2d 556, cert den 370 US 963, 8 L ed 2d 830, 82 S Ct 1593, supra 9[a].
The following additional authority is relevant to the issues discussed in this
In prosecution for robbery in which defendant and his pregnant fiancee were arrested and questioned by police officers, trial court properly admitted defendant's confession, notwithstanding that in response to defendant's inquiries regarding his fiancee, interrogating officer told defendant he did not know whether defendant's fiancee was going to be charged and conveyed impression that his fiancee was still being held, when in fact officer knew defendant's fiancee was not going to be charged, and his fiancee had not been told that she was free to go after making statement, where, although officer did not eliminate defendant's fears that his fiancee would be charged if he did not confess, officer did not indicate that his fiancee would be exonerated by defendant's cooperation. U.S. v. Carter, 910 F.2d 1524, 30 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1087 (7th Cir. 1990).
State court determination that coercive effect of first custodial interrogation of petitioner, in which police falsely suggested that she could avoid murder charge by confessing to robbery without mentioning felony-murder rule, was sufficiently attenuated at time of second interview in which she confessed to robbery, so that confession was voluntary, was not contrary to or unreasonable application of Supreme Court jurisprudence and, thus, did not warrant habeas relief; petitioner, who was veteran of criminal justice system, initiated second interview three days after first interview, police gave Miranda warnings prior to her confession, and petitioner stated that no promises had been made to her. Garvin v. Farmon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd, 258 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 990, 122 S. Ct. 1546, 152 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2002).
Defendant's confession was not obtained through official coercion, though police used special interrogation techniques designed to induce confession, including withholding information from defendant so that detective could "trap him" with it, and using detective's knowledge of shaken-baby syndrome to point out weaknesses of defendant's different explanations of infant's injuries. U.S. Const. Amend. 5. People v. Gray, 975 P.2d 1124 (Colo. Ct. App.
Homicide defendant's statement to police was not voluntary, in light of detective's representation that victim was still alive and actively recovering, which constituted implied promise that defendant could not be charged with murder but could only be charged with aggravated assault, thus inducing confession in hope of receiving lighter punishment. State v. Ritter, 268 Ga. 108, 485 S.E.2d 492 (1997).
So long as defendant was made aware of her right to remain silent and her right to attorney, fact that officers did not inform her that she would be charged with murder until after interrogation did not render her statement involuntary. Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 371 S.E.2d 384 (1988).
Confession voluntarily given following valid waiver of rights was not rendered involuntary or untrustworthy by fact that police informed defendant that they were merely investigating beating, when they knew victim had died. People v. Merchel, 91 Ill. App. 3d 285, 46 Ill. Dec. 751, 414 N.E.2d 804 (5th Dist. 1980).
In murder prosecution, defendant's statement to police was involuntary and inadmissible on Fifth Amendment grounds, where interrogator misled defendant about meaning and consequences of "waiver" and such behavior by interrogator led to subsequent statement. Lynch v. State, 632 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. 1994).
Confession voluntarily given following valid waiver of rights was, as matter of law, admissible in evidence against accused for any purpose in homicide prosecution despite contention that confession was obtained through deception in that police concealed fact victim died from accused. Eliacin v. State, 269 Ind. 305, 380 N.E.2d 548 (1978).
Deception standing alone does not render waiver of constitutional rights involuntary as matter of law unless deceiving acts amount to deprivation of due process, but deception is factor to be considered in reviewing totality of circumstances in making determination as to voluntariness of waiver; statement by assistant county attorney, in response to question by defendant, that he did not know victim's condition, when in fact he knew that victim had died, did not render defendant's waiver of his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination involuntary, and facts given by him during subsequent interrogation were properly admissible. State v. Cooper, 217 N.W.2d 589
Fact that police officers did not advise murder defendant during his interrogation that four of the eyewitnesses had identified another man as the shooter did not, by itself, invalidate defendant's confession. State v. Harris, 105 P.3d 1258 (Kan. 2005).
Defendant's statements to police were not given voluntarily and without coercion where police did not tell defendant that attorney hired by his mother was present at time of interrogation. People v. Brown, 224 Mich. App. 136, 568 N.W.2d 151 (1997).
Confession was not rendered untrustworthy because obtained by subterfuge in that police allowed defendant to think he was going to give statement incriminating others and failed to tell defendant that his girlfriend had told police that defendant had confessed killing to her, where defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights at least four times, knew he was suspect in killing, knew during taped interview that his exculpatory statement was not believed and that interrogating officer believed him to be murderer, and had himself initiated portion of interview in which he ultimately confessed by
(C) 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.